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ABSTRACT

This document sums up the lessons to be learned from 3 years of Ford Foundation's Innovations Awards program activity. The eight programs described herein represent new ways of solving complex problems--from segregated neighborhoods to school dropouts. Each case has unique qualities: the novel idea and the particular circumstances that shaped the way the idea is put into action. Missouri's Parents as Teachers program, inspired by a St. Louis training program for parents of children under age 3, succeeded because of an active coalition of public officials, voluntary organization representatives, university-based researchers, and the governor. Shaker Heights (Ohio) has joined with two other cities (Cleveland Heights and University Heights), and two school districts to devise a multijurisdictional, metropolitan-wide strategy to promote and maintain integration in the eastern Cleveland suburbs. The three cities and the suburban coalition affirmatively market houses to people underrepresented in a designated area. The innovation depends on a partnership spanning all sectors of society and on multijurisdictional support for common objectives. The Family Learning Center at Leslie Public Schools (Ingham County, Michigan) packages comprehensive educational and support services for teenage parents from seven rural school districts. The center, which offers the normal high school curriculum and graduates 90 percent of its students, is supported by state education funds and foundation grants. Five noneducational innovations in Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois, Georgia, and California are also described. Awards for 1986-88 are listed. (MLH)

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INNOVATING AMERICA

Innovations in State and Local Government:

An Awards Program of the Ford Foundation

and the John F. Kennedy School

of Government, Harvard University

Fred Jordan

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Fred Jordan

with Simpson Lawson

Ford Foundation

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FOREWORD

The Ford Foundation is always looking for better ways of addressing tough social problems. As a rule, we have gone about this by working closely with individuals and organizations in the voluntary, nonprofit sector—groups established to act in the public interest. Many of these groups have well-deserved reputations for being creative, quick to recognize new needs, and adept at organizing to meet them. The Foundation has also supported and encouraged innovation in the for-profit sector and by governmental bodies. In recent years our work with government has emphasized strengthening state and local governments' capacities to address important social and economic issues in new ways, and to adapt sensitively to their enlarged responsibilities.

In an era of budget cuts and new federalism, the challenge of sparking innovative and effective local governmental approaches to public problems took on new urgency. In 1985 we decided to recognize directly exemplary public-sector programs that creatively met urgent social needs. Accordingly, the Innovations in State and Local Government Awards Program was established and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University was asked to administer it. A diverse national committee chaired by former Michigan governor William Milliken was asked to oversee the program and select the winners for awards and public recognition.

From 1985 through 1988 roughly 1,000 programs each year applied for the Innovations Awards. The quality of these innovations, the range of problems they addressed, and the inventive means they employed were a tribute to the creative spirit that is alive and well in our country. Of these applicants, some 25 programs a year were selected as finalists, 10 of which were chosen annually to receive awards of up to $100,000. The Foundation issued Innovations Awards for three years, and then, after a hiatus devoted to evaluation and review, resumed the competition in 1990.

Eligible programs are administered or operated under state or local authority; they take a new approach to a pressing social need or

significantly improve an existing program; and they have a proven record of effectiveness and achievement. From this group, award winners are chosen on the basis of the creativity involved in the innovation, the significance of the problem it undertakes to solve, the program's value to the clients who benefit from it, and its transferability to other jurisdictions.

These stories of innovation are the stories of extraordinary individuals who wanted their government to work better and who, stubbornly and tirelessly, pursued the necessary program and policy changes. Many of these innovators are good communicators, skilled at building bridges and forming alliances. Most are optimists capable of inspiring others with their vision for change. The development of human potential, as exemplified in these innovators, appears to be as important to innovation as sound program design.

Under the Foundation's auspices, the stories of these innovators and their ideas are being collected and the development of their innovations documented. Our objective is to share as widely as possible this information about innovation and how it works so that others may learn from it. We are encouraging the replication of these ideas in other parts of the country and are pleased that many of the award winners have already inspired imitation.

The Foundation is also encouraging the study of the process of innovation. On the basis of case studies prepared by Kennedy School researchers, scholars have begun to analyze these initiatives. Their work should result in new knowledge—about what circumstances tend to foster innovation, for example. The case studies, coupled with early findings, are already changing the way students of public administration study the workings of government; the material is also being adapted for training sessions aimed at government practitioners. *Innovating America*, by Fred Jordan, is intended as an accessible account of innovation and how it occurs.

We hope that this book and the other educational materials generated as a result of this program will help contribute to a new, positive sense of excitement about what can be accomplished in public service. With better information about the circumstances that stimulate innovation, public-sector managers can begin to foster an atmosphere in which new ideas are more readily recognized and rewarded. With a stronger appreciation of what can be accomplished in government, citizens can begin to support and applaud the quiet heroism of those who innovate in the public interest.

Franklin A. Thomas
President
Ford Foundation

PREFACE

When I agreed to chair the national committee that oversees the Ford Foundation's Innovations in State and Local Government Awards Program, it was a time of increasing demands on state and local governments. The public resources available to respond to basic social and economic needs were being stretched far beyond their limits—not exactly the best prescription for creativity.

Moreover, based on my own experience as the governor of a major industrial state, I was aware of the many constraints public employees face these days: growing responsibilities, limited resources, and layers of regulation and red tape, which are designed to make government accountable but sometimes have the effect of foreclosing initiative.

So I was surprised and delighted to discover the number, variety, and quality of innovative programs operating across the country. The national committee had a difficult job selecting from among them. Those finally honored with Innovations Awards are extraordinary efforts, which successfully tackle some of America's toughest and most intractable problems.

If the programs are impressive, so too are their creators, who, usually through a strong sense of mission, declined to go along with business as usual. The process of innovation usually was no easy matter—most of the programs evolved through successive modifications and adjustments—but the innovators were publicly accountable throughout. And the programs they designed have helped to enlarge the notion of what is possible in government.

Each of these innovations has immediate value in the state or locality that produced it. And each has potential value as a source of ideas for jurisdictions seeking to solve similar problems. One of the aims of the Innovations Program is to help ensure that information about these innovations is widely available to public servants and citizens across the country. We encourage people to borrow and adapt approaches they can

use. This book is intended to publicize the stories of eight such innovations. Also available are films and study guides, videos describing particular programs, and case studies prepared by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Beyond the task of spreading the good word about what has already been achieved is another task—to identify the conditions that generally encourage innovation in government. The aim is to help create a climate in government in which innovation can flourish. This is a management problem, one that state and local governments are only just beginning to address, yet clearly one of some urgency. If we can discover how to encourage innovation—for example, by rewarding public workers for seizing opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness—then we can build into government a mechanism responsive to change and sensitive to its ongoing need for excellence.

As I review the awards we have made since 1986, I am struck by the success with which state and local governments are working with other sectors of society. Many of the good ideas recognized by the Innovations Program were shaped in partnership with that most innovative of sectors, the charitable, nonprofit sector. Other initiatives depended for their success on the involvement of business and labor. Clearly, cooperative approaches to problem solving are fertile ground for innovation.

Finally, this program has demonstrated to me again the vitality of the federal system. A wholesale shift of responsibility from the federal government to other jurisdictions is clearly undesirable. Yet, even in recent years when federal activism was on the wane, states and localities continued to demonstrate their resourcefulness in addressing pressing domestic policy problems.

Federalism is itself a source of creativity in our democratic government. This program provides more than ample evidence of how each level of government can apply its unique strengths to the common task.

William G. Milliken
Chairman, National Committee on
Innovations in State and
Local Government

INNOVATION: MAKING NEW

CHAPTER

1

Americans have high expectations for their governments. They expect them to deliver public services effectively and efficiently; to provide leadership based on such commonly held values as community cohesion and fairness; to serve the public interest at reasonable cost; and simultaneously to remain accountable and responsive.

Increasingly, Americans expect certain courtesies when they use government services. According to Alan Altshuler and Marc Zegans in an article in the February 1990 issue of *Cities* magazine, "Americans feel aggrieved if bureaucrats treat their problems mechanically, 'by the book,' rather than with sensitivity to their unique concerns."*

Although public expectations remain high, several factors have combined to hamstring state and local government, particularly in the last 15 years. First, available resources have shrunk as a result of federal spending reductions and, in some jurisdictions, caps on state and local taxes. Second, the responsibilities imposed on state and local governments, far from being reduced, have grown substantially. Third, notions of government as ineffective and a drain on society have gained popularity. Not only must state and local employees cope with more work and fewer resources, they also have less public support.

These days a career in public service too often lacks glamor. Attracting and retaining talented personnel, one of the maxims of good business, seems to be difficult. Moreover, although the public may complain about a lack of imagination and initiative in their public servants, they still tend to applaud politicians who promise tighter controls on the "swollen bureaucracy." Wherever people stand on the political spectrum, they tend to question giving "too much" discretion to government

*"Innovation and Creativity: Comparisons Between Public Management and Private Enterprise." Alan Altshuler is director of the A. Alfred Taubman Center for State and Local Government at the Kennedy School. Zegans is executive director of the Innovations in State and Local Government Awards program. Many of the ideas in this chapter come from this article and from conversations with Altshuler.

workers; discretion somehow connotes a lack of accountability. For Americans the fear of possible abuse overshadows interest in positive achievements. When abuses do occur, the response tends to be to impose more controls.

Despite this clash between what is expected and what is permitted, many talented, committed people continue in government service. For them the challenge is to make something happen despite the constraints, or better yet, within the bounds of public accountability, to break through those constraints, come up with a new vision of what government can do, and find practical means of achieving it.

INNOVATION

The Latin root of *innovation* means "to make new." The word is often associated with new discoveries or inventions that transform the quality of life. It has come to describe the link between a fresh idea or insight and a practical problem or objective. Altshuler and Zegans define it as "novelty in action." The result is a way of doing things fundamentally different from that which went before.

In the last decade, private corporations and management theorists have been increasingly concerned with innovation. Successful firms are thought to have found a way to create a corporate climate in which continual innovation is valued and rewarded. Meanwhile, management specialists study the ways in which that innovation occurs.

In the last decade as well, the voluntary sector—nonprofit organizations that specialize in tackling new social problems—has come to see itself as a separate, distinctly innovative sector of society. Many programs and institutions now considered to be integral to the public sector—kindergartens, for example, or libraries—had their origins in the voluntary sector. Meanwhile, more recent innovations—hospices, for example—are gaining wide acceptance.

The incentives for innovation differ. Among private, for-profit innovators, increased profit margins and market shares are the main incentives for "novelty in action," and immediate rewards tend to correspond to the bottom line. Private nonprofit innovators, by contrast, tend to be motivated by the desire to achieve specific objectives in the public interest. Their rewards derive from the personal satisfaction of working toward goals they see as important to society.

INNOVATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

What about innovation in government? When Ford Foundation staff began to discuss this question in 1982, they were familiar with the range of negative attitudes toward government—for example, that government achieves little, that it is part of the problem, that the sources of innovation

are generally elsewhere. Public bureaucracies are seen to be preoccupied with avoiding mistakes rather than with finding ways to be more effective. Elected officials are rarely seen to have a political or personal interest in improving the bureaucracy's capacity to act.

Scattered evidence, in the form of applications for a Foundation grant, for example, indicated that innovative programs were under way in state and local governments across the country, but there was no immediate way of knowing how widespread the phenomenon was; nor was there enough information even to describe the way innovation worked in the public sector.

Foundation staff therefore began to consider ways of recognizing innovations that had occurred in state and local government. They hoped that publicizing stories about such innovations would encourage replication and that, by sparking the public imagination, ideas about what could be achieved through government could be enlarged. They also hoped to stimulate the study of public-sector innovation. If the conditions that promote innovative behavior could be identified, innovation in government might be initiated on a broad scale. Finally, they hoped to attract a new generation of students of public administration to apply their talents to the work of government.

THE SEARCH FOR SUCCESSFUL INNOVATIONS

After consulting with scholars and public officials on these questions, Foundation staff decided to ask the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University to administer the Foundation's new Innovations in State and Local Government Awards Program. A national committee was established, chaired by former governor of Michigan William G. Milliken, to help choose the award-winning programs. Governor Milliken's fellow committee members included elected officials, journalists, scholars, and civic leaders. It was decided that the program would recognize innovative ideas that had some track record of success. At the outset, it was a straightforward competition in which state and local governments were invited—by announcements in public media, house organs, and various journals—to submit descriptions of their most innovative activities.

The response was overwhelming—1,300 applications in 1986, the program's first year. Early media coverage of the program was sometimes misleading, and applicants were sometimes too eager to read their own needs into the program's purposes. For instance, a newspaper article headlined "Cash for Good Ideas" resulted in a shower of applications from inventors hungry for capital.

Faculty and staff from the John F. Kennedy School of Government processed the entries through a rigorous selection procedure that resulted in a group of 75 semifinalists. In a second round of reviews, Kennedy

School staff and knowledgeable practitioners chose the 25 finalists from among the year's top entries.

The 25 programs designated as finalists were visited and evaluated by teams of researchers and practitioners who reported their findings to the national committee. The committee met for two days to review the applications and to interview representatives of the finalists. From this group 10 were selected as Innovations award winners and recipients of Foundation grants of up to $100,000.

In the following two years, 1987 and 1988, Innovations Awards were given to a total of 20 other programs out of a pool of some 2,000 applicants. Then in 1989 the Ford Foundation called a one-year pause in the program. The idea was to sum up the lessons to be drawn from the first three years of program activity—both for the Foundation and for the public. A summary of those lessons is available in this book and also in two films.

Both the films and the book concentrate on eight programs. They were selected to demonstrate how innovation can improve the quality of individual as well as civic life. The brief chronicles of these programs in the following chapters are intended to appeal to a wide audience, including state and local government employees. For practitioners who struggle with seemingly intractable public problems on meager resources, and for citizens who repeatedly indicate that they want public officials to be more than mere caretakers, this report offers clear and compelling evidence that real accomplishments are possible.

EIGHT INNOVATIONS

The programs described in this book represent new ways of solving complex problems—from segregated neighborhoods to school dropouts. Many have helped to transform relationships among public officials, the constituencies they serve, and others in the community, including religious and voluntary organizations, businesses, and labor unions. By stimulating cooperation and communication, the programs have substantially broadened the possibilities for positive change. Other programs have imaginatively applied new technologies to transform basic operating procedures or necessary services, thus providing unexpected benefits to the public.

Each case of innovation has unique qualities: first the novel idea itself and then the particular circumstances that shape the way the idea is put into action. The observations below are intended to provide an overview of the book's descriptive chapters. These summaries concentrate on the innovation itself; subsequent chapters describe the process by which the innovation was achieved.

PARENTS AS TEACHERS, STATE OF MISSOURI. Parents As Teachers is a statewide program that took as its inspiration a program for parents of children under the age of three developed in a suburban St. Louis school district. The state initiative mandates that local school districts provide parents of children under age three with training so that parents can better help their youngsters to learn. Through individual and group meetings the program teaches parents ways to stimulate their children's social development, cognitive skills, and curiosity. Moreover, it monitors and screens the children themselves and refers parents to other social services where needed. This innovation depended upon an active coalition of public officials, representatives of voluntary organizations, university-based researchers, and the governor of the state.

TOWARD EXCELLENCE IN STATE GOVERNMENT, STATE OF MINNESOTA. STEP, which stands for Strive for Excellence in Performance, emphasizes long-term improvement in the quality of state services; it gives latitude for change to mid-level managers who know the system and the problems. By contrast, efforts to improve productivity in other state and local governments have concentrated on top-down mandates to cut costs. STEP, because it broadens support and approval for innovation, has had a multiplier effect on the number of innovative projects the state has been able to generate. It relies upon the advice and assistance of a panel of business, labor, and public-sector leaders and it encourages state employees to think of the people to whom they render services as customers.

COMPUTER–ASSISTED REPORT ENTRY, COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI. Other jurisdictions have applied new technology to improve public services, but St. Louis County has gone one step farther. The police department not only decided to computerize its reporting system, but also to design the software it needed to meet its own specifications. The result is a new, comprehensive system that quickly processes information from victims and witnesses of crimes, allowing police to call in reports on the crimes they are investigating instead of writing them by hand. It is a system that can readily provide an up-to-the-minute look at the information available on a given case or an overview of crime statistics in the area. With strong support from a team of trained civilian operators on duty around the clock, CARE provides management information for precinct officers and also facilitates investigations of serial crimes.

ONE CHURCH–ONE CHILD, STATE OF ILLINOIS. With One Church–One Child the state adoption agency formed an innovative partnership with a network of churches and ministers in the African-American community to promote the adoption of black children. Simultaneously, the agency took steps to revise state policies and practices that were obstacles to black families seeking to adopt. The involvement of the churches greatly increased public awareness of adoption generally and successfully focused attention on the number of black children waiting for permanent families. The program also helped forge new links with other organizations in the community it served. Built on consultation and outreach, this innovation has depended for its success on progressive modifications to make adoptions more accessible.

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, STATE OF GEORGIA. State corrections officials coping with an overburdened prison system, public and judicial preference for strict penalties for crime, and fiscal pressures that prevented the building of new prisons, helped create a range of new probationary and detention programs. Their innovation—alternatives to incarceration—was carefully tailored to satisfy a number of different constituencies. Judges can sentence offenders, depending on the severity of their crime, to one of six kinds of sentencing alternatives, ranging from monthly reporting to a probation officer to continuous supervision. The public approves probationers' performing hours of community service and paying a variety of fees and fines that help support the system itself. Meanwhile, by avoiding a prison term, nonviolent offenders have a better chance of avoiding new convictions.

RACIAL INTEGRATION INCENTIVES, SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO. The suburban city of Shaker Heights has joined with two other cities, Cleveland Heights and University Heights, and with two school districts, to devise a multijurisdictional, metropolitan-wide strategy to promote and maintain integration in the eastern Cleveland suburbs. The three cities and the suburban coalition to which they belong affirmatively market houses to people belonging to racial groups underrepresented in a designated area. In doing so, they cooperate closely with neighborhood associations and private real estate firms to help inform families of the availability of financial incentives established with the support of individuals and private foundations. This innovation depends for its success on a partnership that spans all sectors of society and on multijurisdictional support for common objectives.

MODEL WASTE-WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM, ARCATA, CALIFORNIA. This innovation uses new technology to accomplish a specific purpose—cleaning waste water from the town of Arcata—and simultaneously to provide wider public benefits. Through the revival of wetlands areas capable of filtering nutrient-rich waste water, the town has created the 170-acre Arcata Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary, which has become a center for a wide variety of recreational activities from bird watching to boating. Not only has the marsh attracted wildlife of all kinds, it has also provided a site for aquaculture—for example, salmon are raised in its waters. This innovation owes its existence to a local coalition that relied for technical advice on staff of the local state university. It was developed to counter a more costly traditional waste-water system mandated by the state government.

FAMILY LEARNING CENTER, LESLIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, INGHAM COUNTY, MICHIGAN. The Family Learning Center packages comprehensive educational and support services for teenage parents from seven rural school districts of Ingham County. Pregnant teens and young mothers who might otherwise be forced to abandon their high school education can continue with their classes at the center. It provides day care, transportation, vocational and career counseling, on-site and home health care, and prenatal care. Parenting skills are taught to young fathers as well as to mothers. The center, which offers the normal high school curriculum, graduates 90 percent of its students and at the same time helps them to become better parents. It is supported by a mix of state education funds and foundation grants.

STUDYING INNOVATION

The Innovations Program set out to recognize good programs and to make available information about them and about innovation itself. A particular aim was to inspire people who work for state and local governments around the country. As time passed, another purpose was added—to increase the body of knowledge about public-sector innovations, a field much less well studied than innovations in the private sector.

University schools of public policy and departments of political science have for many years organized their analyses of government around failures. As Alan Altshuler of the Kennedy School says, "Almost all the case studies are of people or legislative agencies that went wrong." Americans expect, he says, that when laws get passed they will be carried out. Academics have concentrated on demonstrating that matters are far more complicated than that.

The Innovations Program has provided solid evidence of successes, which the Kennedy School uses to teach cases in the classroom. This new material allows students to learn from stories of achievement in government as well as of failure. The program has also begun to yield a series of studies from which conclusions are being drawn about innovations in the public sector.

Preliminary findings, according to Altshuler and Zegans, suggest that innovations recognized under the program are "as likely to involve a reconception of mission and clientele as to involve a new service concept or technology." Innovators have typically applied a new idea to a problem that has long been recognized but has proven difficult to solve.

The following eight stories of innovations in state and local government show how public servants scouted for promising ideas to apply to difficult problems and how they adapted to the circumstances in which they were working to help solve the problem.

BORN TO LEARN IN MISSOURI

CHAPTER

2

Arthur Mallory, former Commissioner of the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, once observed, "Visionaries don't expect to do things instantly. In education you think in terms of a decade or in increments of 20 years."

Mallory's axiom clearly applies to Mildred Winter. In an effort begun in 1972, Winter coordinated a variety of public and private efforts to make Missouri the only state in the nation with a statutory mandate to provide parent education, screening, and other family support services in all of its 543 school districts.

The Parents As Teachers program (PAT), authorized by the state's Early Childhood Development Act in 1984, is designed to enhance child development and school performance by supporting a child's first teachers—his parents—in the formative first three years of the child's life. Based on more than three decades of research in early childhood education, PAT offers Missouri families of preschool children:

- Personalized home visits by specially trained educators who provide timely information at appropriate stages of a child's development. They also offer tips on such topics as home safety, effective discipline, and constructive play.
- Group meetings with parents of children of similar ages, during which parents can share experiences, common concerns, frustrations, and successes.
- Periodic monitoring and formal screening to assure that youngsters do not reach age three with an undetected health problem, handicap, or developmental delay. Screening also helps identify children with advanced abilities.
- A referral network so that parents who need special assistance (medical or financial help, for example) can locate resources not available through PAT.

A mother works with her child. Studies find cognitive intelligence, language competence, and other skills well established by age three.

That this innovative program came to be adopted in the "Show Me" state is a monument to Winter's persistence, to the support of powerful citizen groups, and to a governor's appreciation of how much guidance a first-time parent needs.

In 1972 when Arthur Mallory was Missouri's Education Commissioner he established a state office on early childhood education and named Mildred Winter to head it. At the time, she was director of a program in the suburban Ferguson-Florissant school district of St. Louis County that involved parents in the education of their young children. Since 1970 this district had offered parents of children under age five a range of programs, including home visits, tests of learning ability, and group meetings with other parents of preschool children. These activities provided some of the building blocks for the program Winter was later to inaugurate statewide.

When Winter accepted the new position in Jefferson City, Missouri's capital, she took a cut in income and agreed to work an administrator's 12-month year. She also worked what Mallory remembers as 75-hour weeks. Winter learned quickly that selling the basic design of the Ferguson-Florissant program to legislators and decision makers in other parts of the state was an enormous undertaking.

To assist these decision makers in constructing a model of parent education grounded in sound, pedagogic research, Winter and Mallory retained as a consultant Burton White, director of a 13-year study of early development by the Harvard Preschool Project. To underscore the appalling lack of guidance available to parents of young children, White once quipped: "You get more information with your new car than you do with your new baby." With no "owner's manual" for their offspring, too many parents learn childrearing by trial and error. Deprived of the right kind of education in their first years, many children later fail or underachieve in the classroom.

BUILDING A COALITION

The education of parents of very young children was not a burning issue among Missouri legislators in the 1970s. Nor did it seem to be high on the agenda of people outside Ferguson-Florissant. Headstart, virtually the only program to survive the dismantling of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society in the mid-1970s, was universally admired. But it was geared mainly to providing educationally and culturally deprived children with advantages their homes presumably failed to provide. Only peripherally did it bring parents into the process of helping their young children develop.

Few Missouri state officials besides Winter and Mallory perceived the need for general parent-childhood education. There was one outstanding exception—Governor Christopher "Kit" Bond, today a United States senator. In 1981, during the second of his two, non-consecutive terms as governor, Bond became a father for the first time at the age of 41. His support was later crucial in enacting the landmark Early Childhood Education Act. But in 1972 that legislation was more than a decade away, and a combination of gubernatorial pull and a massive push by a diverse alliance of corporate and foundation leaders would be necessary to realize it.

To start building a coalition, Winter, in consultation with Mallory, drafted a position paper to provide direction to the Education Department and the public schools on parent-child education in preschool years. Although the final results of White's preschool study would not be available for several years, Winter based the concept for the Missouri program on research White and his colleagues had done in the Harvard Preschool Project.

A GROUP OF COMMITTED ACTIVISTS

The nucleus of a constituency for the program was a group of educational activists who had been committed to early childhood education since the 1950s. This group included Jane Paine, consultant to the St. Louis-based Danforth Foundation, and Carolyn Losos, a former teacher later named to chair the Commissioner's Committee on Parents As Teachers.

In 1975 the first in a series of statewide conferences was held to promote public awareness of and develop broad support for parent education and, at the same time, to make it clear that such educational initiatives were at the top of Governor Bond's list of priorities. After the conference and as a result of the interest it generated, two legislators introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to fund screening of children and to authorize parent-child programs for three- and four-year-olds. It was the first of several measures to clear the House, only to be subsequently rejected in the Senate.

Opponents of the legislation regarded themselves as defenders of parents' right to raise their children free of government intervention. Their efforts were backed by groups outside the state. Supporters of the Bond-backed legislation recall witnesses characterizing it as a "Communist plot to take control of the minds of children."

Prevention legislation, so called because it was designed to prevent more costly and less effective remedial training for educationally delayed children, was also defeated, but that did not deter House supporters. A prevention bill was offered in every session of the legislature in the 1970s, even after Bond was defeated in 1976. These bills consistently lost in the Senate.

State support for education in general wilted during the term of Bond's successor as governor, Joseph Teasdale. During these lean years, the advocates of early childhood education were sustained, as they had been earlier, by a private-sector coalition coordinated by the Danforth Foundation.

STUDY RESULTS AND A PILOT PROGRAM

Bond was elected governor again in 1980, and he took an active role in planning another major statewide conference for the following year. The conference attracted 200 people with an interest in the education of young children—people in business and industry as well as professional educators. As a result, a top aide, directed by Bond to spend the entire day at the session, wrote a memo urging the governor to intensify his efforts on behalf of early childhood education.

By now the findings of the Harvard Preschool Project were underscoring the importance of Winter's efforts and those of her colleagues. Writing later in the May 1985 issue of the magazine *Principal*, she noted that the Harvard research revealed that "experiences during the early years influence the development of all major abilities. The extensive observations of children and parent-child interactions in homes, representing a variety of educational and economic backgrounds, make this study of particular value."

The Harvard study, Winter noted, showed that a child's language competence, curiosity, social skills, and cognitive intelligence at age six could with few exceptions be predicted at age three. "Our education system, however, essentially ignores the formative years," Winter said, "despite the fact that it is very difficult to compensate for a poor beginning with any means we now have available."

The Harvard study confirmed convictions long held by the group that had steadfastly advocated parent education. They again drew on a mixture of private and public resources to start a four-year pilot project that became the forerunner of Parents As Teachers. Called New Parents as Teachers, it was a cooperative effort of the Department of Education, four Missouri school districts, and the Danforth Foundation, which had earlier provided funding to hire Burton White as senior consultant for the Harvard study. For Mallory, it was significant that the pilot project would represent research "done in Missouri, for Missourians, by Missourians."

GEARING UP

Most of 1981 was devoted to training two parent educators and an administrator assigned part time for each of four pilot sites and to recruiting families to participate. The experiment began in 1982 with 390 families, representing a cross section of society based on socioeconomic status, age,

Parents As Teachers brings together parents of children of the same age to discuss their experiences and ways to stimulate their children's learning.

and family background. Enrollment was limited to families expecting their first child between December 1981 and September 1982; none of the participants was to have had any previous childrearing experience. A statewide committee was named to supervise the project.

Participating families received the following services:

- Screenings to spot potential diseases or disabilities.
- Monthly personal visits by parent educators who provided guidance on a variety of subjects: for example, ways to identify infant hearing problems; tips for picking toys; instruction on the dos and don'ts of toilet training; information on how infants and toddlers classify objects and identify colors.
- Monthly meetings, convened by parent educators. These were forums for discussion of progress and problems, pride and disappointment. Typical comments and questions: "Aaron's just 18 months and already into the Terrible Twos." "Does Debby understand any words yet?"

An independent testing firm evaluated the pilot program after its third year. The results showed that children in the sample were significantly more advanced than a comparable group in language development, problem solving, and other intellectual abilities, and they showed more positive relationships with adults. The evaluation also revealed that families in the pilot program benefited, regardless of social and economic factors. Mallory and Burton White hailed the results. "This is the strongest stuff I've seen in 28 years in working in child development," White told the *New York Times*, which reported the findings.

Even before the evaluation, the backers of early childhood legislation were moving with new vigor. Education Commissioner Mallory named an advisory committee of influential Missourians. Headed by former teacher Carolyn Losos, this group began to break down resistance to the measure. That they were able to engage in outright lobbying made them valuable allies to state education officials, who are forbidden to lobby.

THE GOVERNOR MAPS A NEW STRATEGY

The governor and his aides had also acquired new legislative skills. In 1984, as Bond's second term drew to an end, they developed a strategy to gain passage of a new parent-education bill as his legacy to Missouri. This time they introduced the bill in the Senate and steered it to the Public Health Committee, considered a "friendlier" panel than the Education Committee.

Five years later, key players in the legislative battle still had vivid memories of the struggle. Jane Nelson, a St. Louis corporate attorney who was a special assistant to Bond in 1984, remembered the governor's push to mobilize state agencies to support the bill. The Department of Corrections

compiled a profile of offenders that revealed a high correlation between criminal acts and learning disability. Other agencies weighed in with what they hoped would be persuasive data. Yet some administrators of traditional education programs needed a nudge; they saw parent education as a potential rival for resources under the state's formula for distributing education funds.

Members of Carolyn Losos' committee lined up to testify. Predicted shortages of skilled employees, combined with work-force projections for the end of the century, spurred industrialists to join the advocacy side. The witness lists at hearings ranged from representatives of welfare recipients to Junior League spokeswomen.

The governor's last salvos included widely publicized appearances in school classrooms, some of them in the company of his little son, Sam. Here and in other forums the governor spoke in personal terms about his own anxieties and joy as a new parent. He also engaged in old-fashioned political persuasion. One observer suggests that the governor passed the word that he wouldn't sign a bill raising legislators' pay unless the General Assembly passed S.B. 658.

THE BILL PASSES HANDILY

While the campaign for the legislation gathered strength, the campaign against it was weakening, in part because of the opposition's stridency. Moreover, the country's apathy toward nationwide educational needs had been jolted by disclosures of *A Nation at Risk*, the report commissioned by Secretary of Education Terrell Bell as he left office.

Bonnie Hausman, a senior policy analyst with the Harvard Family Research Project, has observed that S.B. 658 was one of those rare measures in which substantive policies and political expediency meshed. "For example," Hausman wrote in *Educational Horizons* (Fall/Winter, 1989), "the decisions to make the program universal rather than targeted, voluntary rather than mandatory, and to limit its scope (no district obligation beyond the level of state reimbursement) were all justified on substantive grounds, but imperative on political grounds."

The PAT leadership coalition unanimously supported a program that would be open to all parents. Winter told Bonnie Hausman that targeted programs create stigma and cut participation rates.

We can't say that only the poor need it; parents with two Ph.D.s can be basket cases when it comes to parenting. And when middle-class families participate it attracts the at-risk families because it is not seen as a program for losers.

Ironically, rural resentment of Missouri's largest cities led to a requirement that all school districts offer parent-child education. Rural Missouri legislators chafe when funds are channeled to remedy social

problems in St. Louis and Kansas City, problems that do not exist on the same scale in other parts of the state. A rural lawmaker, fearing S.B. 658 would favor urban districts over rural areas, sought to defeat the bill with an amendment that would require all school districts to offer it. This tactic backfired. The House accepted his amendment and passed the bill handily. The measure won almost unanimous consent in the Senate. Thus, although family participation remained voluntary, school district participation became mandatory.

Bond signed the bill into law June 12, 1984, capping a 12-year effort by his administration and the Winter-led coalition. Funding would have to wait until the next session of the legislature, however, under Missouri statutory procedures. If parent-child education was to get under way immediately after a 1985 appropriation, a cadre of parent educators had to be trained immediately. Once again foundation and corporate checkbooks were opened, and a staff was ready that year to provide services for 10 percent of the state's eligible families, the proportion covered by the first $2.8 million appropriation.

HOW THE FORMULA WORKS

All Missouri parents with children under the age of three are eligible to participate in PAT programs. However, the school district is not obligated to provide services beyond the level of state reimbursement. As a result, unless a district chooses to supplement the funds it receives from the state, these services are available to only a fraction of the school district's eligible parents.

Districts are reimbursed for services on the basis of participation levels. With an increase in appropriations to $5.7 million in 1987, the average statewide participation level grew to 20 percent (31,800 families). In the program's third year, 1988, funds were increased to just over $11 million, providing services to 30 percent of eligible families (53,000 families) statewide.

One of the major functions of the Missouri PAT program is marketing. Because this program is not targeted, marketing must be directed to parents across the spectrum of social and economic groups.

Program directors welcome middle-income parents for many reasons. Foremost among these reasons is the conviction that if PAT has an economically and socially diverse clientele it cannot be labeled a welfare program. The enrollment rate among young professionals is substantial. "Yuppie parents are out to get everything they can for their children," one St. Louis observer said.

Special efforts must be made to recruit lower-income parents, who do not respond so readily to such programs. At the beginning of the 1989-90 school year, the Parents As Teachers Center began an advertising

Parents As Teachers supports home visits by specially trained educators who advise parents on the development of their children.

campaign called "Born to Learn." It features photographs of irresistibly charming babies with a text explaining the program and inviting parents to participate. The center is also distributing a video to all Missouri hospitals with maternity facilities and prenatal clinics. Funded by St. Louis's CPI Corporation, the tape opens with a doctor handing a baby to a parent. All these efforts supplement such tested marketing methods as the distribution of brochures and flyers, the airing of public service announcements, and the continual struggle to get the program and the issues it addresses discussed on television and radio talk shows.

Participants in many PAT programs include unwed, teenage mothers and pregnant teenagers. Directors of the PAT program in Missouri's Meramec Valley School District estimate that the high school dropout rate among teen parents fell to zero during the 1987-88 school year, largely as a result of formation of a group called TAMOS, Teenage Moms. In previous years, eight to twelve girls had quit school annually because of pregnancy. Besides giving teens the same kind of support it offers other parents, the Meramec Valley program counsels young mothers and fathers about how to deal with their own parents, advises them about parental legal rights, and helps them get health care for themselves and their babies.

BORN TO LEARN IN MISSOURI

With parent education institutionalized in Missouri, Education Commissioner Mallory established the National Center for Parents As Teachers at the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Mildred Winter became the center's first director. Its advisory board includes Missouri officials, long-time PAT supporters, and nationally recognized scholars in education. Among the latter group is Dr. T. Berry Brazelton of Harvard Medical School, who has helped the center revise lesson materials for parent educators. To strengthen the PAT program the center conducts training institutes for teachers and administrators in Missouri. It also oversees the "export" of PAT's approach, offers training to people from outside the state, and assists visitors who wish to observe home visits and other PAT activities.

PAT PROGRAMS OPERATING IN 62 SITES

The Center for Parents As Teachers has helped establish PAT programs at 62 sites in 28 other states, according to March 1990 figures. It provides training for start-up staff and monitors fledgling programs. Programs that meet the center's criteria can advance from provisional affiliation with the center to active affiliation within a year. Affiliation entitles programs to display the Parents As Teachers logo and to use training materials developed by the center. Moreover, programs deemed to offer adequate training may be considered for training affiliation.

A number of states are well on the way to enacting similar programs statewide. Texas, Rhode Island, and Delaware are working toward statewide expansion of pilot programs, and the Louisiana State Education Agency has inaugurated PAT on a regional basis. Funding has been made available for the program in Connecticut, Illinois, and Ohio. Although California's governor declined to sign legislation similar to Missouri's, the California assembly is expected to try again this year. The Kansas legislature has approved enabling legislation, which was signed by the governor.

Government officials have come to observe the program from Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia. Some were perhaps attracted by a documentary done by the British Broadcasting Company. The center's affiliates have also contributed resources: for example, thanks to a California affiliate, the center's materials for parents have been translated into Spanish, and into Portuguese thanks to an affiliate in East Providence, Rhode Island.

In its activities in Missouri and in its efforts to "export" the program to other states and localities, center staff seek to measure up to an assessment by noted Yale University child psychologist Ed Zigler: "It's a vanguard program; it's where the world ought to be going."

SANDRA HALE'S EXPOSE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER

3

Sandra Hale, Minnesota's ebullient Commissioner of Administration, understands that good government initiatives, even nationally recognized, highly innovative ones, do not generate headlines or television footage. So she remains unfazed when reporters ask her about STOMP, their mangling of the acronym STEP (for Strive for Excellence in Performance). She even retains her composure when told that she has been characterized as someone bent on "telling employees to feel good about themselves." But then she has good reason to feel satisfied with the 55 or so projects completed or under way through STEP.

The program has done what it was designed to do—generate positive change in the state bureaucracy and enhance the quality of public service by tapping employee creativity. Moreover, STEP has attracted attention outside the state (Hawaii has already adopted a similar approach), and it is the subject of a guidebook published by the Urban Institute, entitled *Managing Change: A Guide to Producing Innovation from Within*. Hale has described STEP to people at home and abroad, as far away as Wollongong, Australia, when she participated in the Australia–U.S. Binational Conference on Innovation in Local Government. Closer to home, a Minnesota business executive paid STEP the ultimate compliment—he suggested that private-sector managers emulate STEP's example.

STEPPARENTS

STEP was born of the deliberations of a group Sandra Hale calls STEPparents. In 1984, at the behest of newly elected Governor Rudy Perpich, she convened a panel of state managers, corporate executives, and scholars to draft a blueprint for improving the operation of state government during Perpich's second term. The panel met at a time when there had been much discussion—at the national as well as the state level—of ways to boost productivity and efficiency in both government

Commissioner of Administration Sandra Hale looks to the STEP program to generate innovation throughout Minnesota state government.

and business and of ways to reduce waste, fraud, and corruption in government specifically.

The President's Commission on Productivity had examined factors that were causing U.S. industry, once unchallenged in world markets, to lose ground to European, Japanese, and other Asian trading partners. And the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control—better known as the Grace Commission after its chairman, industrialist J. Peter Grace—had just delivered a 47-volume report with 2,478 recommendations of ways to cut costs. The panel claimed that potential savings amounted to as much as $424 billion.

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Many of the STEPparents recalled efforts to increase productivity during the first Perpich administration. One initiative involved turning off lights and compressing a five-day, 40-hour work week into four 10-hour days to save building-operation costs. Another attempted to reduce paper-shuffling by putting a freeze on the purchase of file cabinets and banishing older files to the state archives. The conferees also remembered how state employees had responded to a 1971 productivity initiative called LEAP (Loaned Executive Action Program). Because employees regarded many of LEAP's recommendations as unworkable, they had either ignored them or carried them out halfheartedly.

What most lingers, however, in the collective memory of the Minnesota government work force is an unpopular directive banning coffee-making machines from state offices. Perpich recalls it today with chagrin. At the time he felt he was fully justified in issuing the ban. There had been fires in state office buildings, and federal occupational safety regulations were construed as warranting the ban. Not until Perpich went to work for the Control Data Corporation, after his defeat for reelection in 1978, did he fully understand how state employees must have felt when he pulled the plug on their coffee pots. While working in the company's Austrian branch, he witnessed the staff's fury when an American executive tried to deprive them of the wine they had traditionally kept in office coolers.

Perpich returned to politics with the realization that any administrative edict, no matter how firmly grounded in law and logic, had little chance of succeeding if it was not generated from within the organization. This maxim guided the thinking of the group Hale convened to study ways to improve state government.

While many ad hoc government study commissions of the 1980s sought efficiency and productivity, a growing body of corporate analysts advocated pursuing higher goals. They stressed the pursuit of excellence. They also observed that it was necessary to acknowledge that change was inevitable in order to channel it in positive directions. An increasing number of public-sector managers were reading treatises by management experts such as Tom Peters and Yale scholar Rosabeth Moss Kanter, along

with advice about how to adapt "quality circles" and other Japanese techniques to improve participation by American employees.

The STEPparents had no wish to repeat the vain effort to impose a panel of private-sector efficiency experts on state employees. They searched instead for a way to encourage state employees to come up with their own initiatives for promoting positive change in Minnesota government. "We looked for something that would work from the inside out, not outside in," said Peter Hutchinson, Vice President of Dayton Hudson Corporation.

The founding group also included William Andres, Dayton Hudson's chairman, who later with Perpich became the first co-chair of the STEP program's steering committee; Babak Armajani, Assistant Commissioner of Administration and a former management consultant; Don Wortman, a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration; and two officials of the Department of Administration's Management Analysis Division: Terry Bock, its director, and Jean Erickson, who was also President of the American Society for Productivity Improvement.

Each of the founders brought his or her own priorities to the table. Hale and Hutchinson urged that the program concentrate on long-term change, not quick fixes, in order to encourage employee risk taking, experimentation, and learning. Wortman, who had collaborated with other public administration scholars in a report entitled *Revitalizing Federal Management*, emphasized the importance of making the best use of the energies and talents of innovative agency staff members. Armajani, who had reentered state government after a stint as a management consultant, emphasized the importance of identifying a base line for measuring change; that, he maintained, would give managers a better way to gauge progress and identify operational needs.

Andres' commitment to productivity and his advocacy of customer service had long been demonstrated in his work for Dayton Hudson's network of prestigious retailers. But he was unsure how these approaches could be translated from a retail setting to state government. He noted that in retailing if the fundamentals are right, productivity follows, and he concluded that the same principles probably applied to government as well.

No widely heralded "white paper" or gilt-edged volume of recommendations issued from these deliberations. What did emerge was a set of STEP hypotheses. They can be summarized as follows:

- Close contact with customers provides sound understanding of their needs. Wherever a customer for state services can be identified, that person is to be considered the first among equals.
- Increased participation in decision making by state employees taps their knowledge, skills, and commitment.

- Increased discretionary authority gives managers and employees greater control over, and accountability for, the bottom line.
- Partnerships allow the sharing of knowledge, expertise, and other resources.
- State-of-the art productivity-improvement techniques enhance performance.
- Improved work measures provide a basis for planning and implementing service improvements and giving workers information about their performance.

HOW THE PROGRAM WORKS

SANDRA HALE'S EXPOSE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

The STEP steering committee, which is co-chaired by the governor and a corporate chief executive officer who represents the prestigious Minnesota Business Partnership, includes senior officials of business, unions, state government, citizen groups, educational and research institutions, and nonprofit organizations. The program, which has undergone considerable fine-tuning since it was instituted in 1985, works this way:

Employees submit brief project proposals, which are reviewed quarterly by a subcommittee, or screening panel, of the steering committee. If the screening panel recommends the proposal for further development, a staff person is temporarily assigned to work on the project pending final steering committee review. The applicant refines the proposal in consultation with a team of staff counselors and, usually, a partner from business or government who knows the field in which the employee works. Although applicants are encouraged to select partners, they are not required to do so.

Finally, if the refined proposal substantially meets the program criteria—it may be judged, for example, to exhibit "closeness to the customer," or to hold managers accountable for the "bottom line" in their program area and for achievement of measurable results—it goes to the full steering committee for official approval.

Three hundred proposals were submitted in the first year; 20 were selected as STEP projects. The following examples illustrate some of their achievements. The Department of Finance found that it could earn more than $1 million per year in interest through fast-track processing of transactions. In a project called Paper Chase, rehabilitation staff at St. Peter Regional Treatment Center cut the number of forms used from eight to one; as a result, employees were able to free two hours per week for work on other professional assignments. And a regional treatment center determined that by taking in laundry from several non-state service agencies it could partly recover the $500,000 it had paid for new, labor-saving laundry equipment.

Before STEP could be put in motion, Sandra Hale and Terry Bock, director of her management analysis division and STEP's executive director, had to build a constituency for it. Not only do the management styles of these energetic administrators complement each other, but their preferred roles are different—Hale is the "outside" person and Bock the "inside" person.

To diverse audiences and a wide circle of friends and acquaintances, Hale declared that it was time for a moratorium on government bashing. This practice had started in the late 1970s and had grown to a high pitch in the 1980s. The reputations of all public servants had been tarnished by these attacks.

Hale took on the critics at a 1987 conference that attracted key public and private decision makers along with hundreds of state and local government employees. It was one of Minnesota's typically arctic winter days, but the room was packed. "For every example of waste and mismanagement, you and I know of 10 examples of dedicated, superior performance and innovative thinking," Hale said. "This difference in perception is a problem we must tackle." Two years later the blue-ribbon National Commission on Public Service (also known as the Volcker Commission) would also call for "a renewed sense of commitment to a renewed sense of public service."

In an environment in which journalists and legislators instinctively probe for evidence of fraud and mismanagement, Hale has continued to emphasize that it is her mission to "expose good government."

Besides proclaiming this message in public forums, Hale worked informally to gain the support of community leaders, many of whom she knew through other civic ventures. With STEP already bearing the seal of approval of Dayton Hudson management, getting support from other affiliates of the Minnesota Business Partnership wasn't hard for Sandra Hale. She had chaired the board of the Guthrie Theater at a time when that repertory theater was the envy of regional patrons of the performing arts throughout the nation. She had also chaired the Minnesota State Arts Board, which had gained national attention during her tenure. Before 1983 she had been an associate professor at Metropolitan State University in the Twin Cities. Her ties to movers and shakers and behind-the-scene doers extended to a variety of fields.

While Hale was working the executive suites, Terry Bock was rallying managers in the line agencies. Because Minnesota is a strong union state, one of his first jobs was to enlist support from union

representatives in government and private industry. Bock took pains to include union representation at every stage of the STEP planning process, building on the substantial trust he already enjoyed with labor leaders. He recalls asking a veteran representative of the government-employee union, "Trust me on this one, at least for six months."

One result of these consultations was that STEP's name was changed even before the program went public. Thus Strive for Efficiency and Productivity became Strive for Excellence in Performance after Hale was informed that "productivity" was viewed by some national union leaders as a buzzword for "taking it out of the hide of employees." She and Bock also abandoned a privatization project out of deference to the unions, though they did retain some of the spirit of privatization in their later emphasis on "marketplace dynamics."

SANDRA HALE'S EXPOSE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

How do the ideas that were the inspiration for STEP, some of them borrowed from the literature on private management, translate to the public sector? It is clear that unless department store buyers are close to their customers they are unable to match merchandise to their customers' tastes and pocketbooks. But how does a bureaucrat develop this kind of insight?

A STEP PROJECT—USING MARKETING TO IMPROVE THE PARKS

The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) was one of the first state agencies to use STEP principles in organizing its response to a problem. In 1985 the Parks and Recreation Division recognized that it was losing customers. Overall attendance was dropping, and parks at a distance from metropolitan areas were underused. Yet entrance fees provided a third of the division's budget. The balance came from appropriations, which had taken a five-year slide. Clearly, a marketing approach was needed. A marketing presentation at an annual conference for park managers helped highlight that need, and it coincided with the first call for STEP proposals by the governor's office. The DNR proposed to develop a strategy that would help match the outdoor recreation people wanted with the park system's natural resources.

Once they overcame institutional resistance to what was initially perceived as self-promotion, park managers turned to a tested marketing tool, the survey. Survey findings helped in planning the location of new trails; they also revealed that most park visitors approved of sufficient infringement on the wilderness to permit installation of electric hookups for camp vehicles and play equipment. Then the division yielded to the public's preference for plastic over cash and started accepting payment of fees with credit cards. In 1987 a partnership with owners of a gift shop at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport increased park sales of gifts by 50 percent.

These efforts were rewarded by increased attendance. The number of park visitors increased by one-half million, or 12 percent, between fiscal 1986 and 1987, the period when results from the marketing strategy could be expected to appear. By the end of fiscal 1989, attendance had grown to nearly twice the four million people visiting the parks in 1984.

This improvement encouraged the DNR to take its marketing approach department-wide. Here's where the agency's private-sector partners proved their worth. Marketing specialists from 3-M, Toro, and Northwest Airlines, and from Twin Cities advertising agencies agreed to meet with DNR managers to help them draft marketing plans for each division. At first, agency managers were apprehensive. Not many had ever taken part in a public-private partnership even though many public administration articles praised such arrangements. But the DNR managers' anxieties were unwarranted. "The specialists assured us we were taking the right approach," said Tom Bauman, manager of the department's marketing project. "They helped us identify problems and donated time and effort to help us solve them on a *pro bono* basis." At one point in the search for marketing solutions, an outside consultant challenged a DNR committee to imagine that they were private owners of the state park system and to design it accordingly. They complied—and came up with a long list of ideas. When the committee reviewed the list to eliminate ideas unworkable under state ownership they had to delete only two.

These marketing efforts have brought the agency close enough to the customer to realize that there are some conflicting expectations among its users. Historically, the timber industry, which is regulated by the Forestry Division, has been one of the division's chief clients. But other clients, individual users moved by increased awareness of environmental considerations, have appealed to the DNR to protect the park system's expanses of wilderness. The conservationists among them ask for a greater variety of trees. Bird watchers want vegetation that will attract colorful species. The differences between the timber users and the individual users are heightened because a surge in the demand for a manufactured wood product called wafer board has prompted timbering giants such as Potlatch, Boise Cascade, and Lake Superior Paper to harvest Minnesota forests more intensively. Tensions between the industry and environmentalists have been running high, but Bauman and his associates hope to resolve differences over conflicting uses through mediation.

ANOTHER STEP PROJECT—SENTENCING TO SERVE

The Department of Natural Resources has another STEP-launched project, called Sentencing to Serve, which is run jointly with the Department of Corrections and some private-sector partners. John McLagan, who heads

the program, keeps a four-inch-thick scrapbook of newspaper and magazine clippings describing the project.

Newspaper photographs show prisoners thinning timber stands, repairing forest drainage ditches, and cleaning up debris after forest fires. Another group, featured in the sports pages, are stocking a lake with fingerlings that would soon be game fish.

To McLagan the basic purpose of the program is punishment, paying society back by performing services useful to others. As an alternative to jail, McLagan suggested, it has a lot of advantages. "Jails," he said, "are expensive. People hurt one another in jail. It breaks up families. So if you have people who don't need that kind of security, why not use another form of punishment?" His question is rhetorical. Not since the corrections staff convinced their natural resources counterparts that they would not put "thugs in the woods" has anyone challenged the program.

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Besides its possible rehabilitative effect on the offenders, Sentencing to Serve has achieved significant cost savings—as much as $32,000 in six months for one county—by reducing the need to pay for new prison beds. These measurable benefits satisfy one of the specific STEP criteria.

After Sentencing to Serve was nurtured through a pilot stage with private funds, the Corrections Department put up $700,000 to expand it, and Perpich held a press conference to launch it. Popular with both conservatives and liberals, Sentencing to Serve is now a line item in the budget of the Corrections Department, which last year got $1.5 million for the program.

McLagan reflects on the generous press coverage and the official approval the program now enjoys and wonders whether it would have been started "if I just sat down and wrote up the program concept and said I would like you to try this. I believe in my heart we never would have gotten it going without the status it gained by being chosen as a STEP experiment."

MARKET DYNAMICS

The DNR's successful marketing ventures and the Corrections Department's Sentencing to Serve are just two of the STEP-initiated projects that demonstrate the value of the Minnesota program. But other changes are afoot in the state's government as well. Some agency managers have launched successful innovations without benefit of the early nurturing STEP provides. Hale and her staff applaud these efforts; she calls them STEPchildren.

The Department of Administration is now engaged in an effort to shift from its conventional role as an "overhead" agency to an enterprise role. It has begun to practice, and to encourage its constituent line agencies to practice, "marketplace dynamics." To carry out functions once frozen

Under the STEP program, the Department of Natural Resources surveyed park visitors and introduced services visitors said they wanted.



in bureaucratic procedures, the department is reshaping itself to meet standards of a "new vision" of state administration. This "new vision" departs in significant ways from the good government model developed by public administration reformers 50 years ago, says Jeff Zlonis, Deputy Commissioner of Administration.

The good government model focused on such values as efficiency, control, consistency, and uniformity, and it tended to be inward looking, according to Zlonis. On the other hand, the enterprise model stresses the creation of value, empowerment, opportunity, and flexibility; it aims to serve the customer.

"We don't want to throw away the values established by the reform movement," Zlonis hastens to add. "You don't want to lose methods that promote efficiency and honesty. But we sensed that people in the line agencies had come to see using our services as a burdensome necessity. We felt we had to encourage an appropriate level of use of our services. We wanted to retain compliance with procedural norms but we wanted to provide mechanisms for making administrators accountable to the legislature and the public."

SANDRA HALE'S EXPOSE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

The Department of Administration has adopted a strategy that embraces marketplace dynamics. It recognizes three categories of state functions:

- Control and oversight functions. Funded primarily from the general fund, these responsibilities include enforcing compliance with traditional norms and with the governor's and legislature's dictates.
- Utility functions. Responsibilities here include allocating computer services, establishing volume-based rates for those services, and seeing that legislative and executive mandates are carried out. Those mandates include encouraging use of Minnesota products—for example, using ethanol in state-owned vehicles and soybean products in inks.
- Marketplace functions. The department encourages free and open competition in purchasing and in contracting services. For example, its Management Analysis Division (MAD) conducts studies for the governor and the legislature financed from a general fund budget. But it also does management consulting for state agencies on a fee-for-service basis and competes for its contracts.

When the quasi-governmental retirement system advertised for bids on a major analytical project, MAD found itself bidding against five of the Big Eight accounting firms. Before MAD staff made their presentation to the retirement system's board of overseers, one official is reported to have said, "There is no way anybody in state government can get this contract; they are not competent." After their presentation, that skeptic led the fight to get MAD's bid accepted.

How many strides has Minnesota taken beyond the government reform movement? Is it moving in the right direction? What is the export potential of a process crafted by the government of a populace that puts a premium on quality of services and is willing to pay the taxes needed to achieve them?

A comprehensive appraisal of STEP and of other Minnesota initiatives may not be available for years. After all, it has taken a half century for public administrators to amalgamate the notion of customer responsiveness with the precepts of governmental reform. However, preliminary assessments of the STEP program are positive. Though Sandra Hale sometimes feels the local press has denied the program the attention it deserves, *Minneapolis Star & Tribune* editorial writer Leonard Inskip gave STEP one of its strongest endorsements when he suggested that the program may well become Governor Rudy Perpich's most enduring legacy.

INNOVATION BY THE NUMBERS

CHAPTER

4

"I'm sorry, Colonel, but we've looked at this idea of computerizing patrol report writing, and we think it can't be done."

"Well, do it anyhow," Colonel G.H. Kleinknecht, the superintendent of police of St. Louis County, Missouri, is reported to have replied.

The dissident's mistake was not in arguing with Colonel Kleinknecht about whether it was possible to find a better way to get reports from police officers—he insists on debate as a matter of management principle—but rather in asserting that the idea would not work without having another suggestion about how to solve the problem. That kind of response offends Kleinknecht almost as much as the waste, delay, and duplication that he found in the department's "information products," as he calls them, when he took over in 1973.

Efficiency and effectiveness are important to Kleinknecht, a former police management consultant turned law enforcement executive who is proud of the fact that he did not come up through the police ranks. "Colonel" just happens to be the title conferred on the head of the St. Louis County police department.

Kleinknecht recounts the way the department used to handle traffic tickets with a touch of disgust in his voice. "We had one person who did nothing but notarize traffic tickets all day long. 'Why are you doing that?' I asked. 'Because the prosecutor says so,' the worker responded." The next day Kleinknecht told the woman's supervisor to give her some other kind of work to do; no longer would the department notarize tickets. "Four months later," he said, "the prosecutor noticed this and complained. He couldn't show us a reason for having to notarize traffic tickets other than that is what had always been done."

CARE operators are on duty around the clock to enter reports from officers and citizens on crime committed in St. Louis County.

That something has always been done in a certain way is no recommendation to Colonel Kleinknecht. Indeed, the assertion makes him suspect that at least one better way can be found to get the job done, one the person making the assertion should have already discovered and put into effect.

"What are you doing?" "Why?" These two questions seem to predominate in Kleinknecht's conversations with his employees. The answers have led to more than one innovation in the way the department enforces laws and protects the public safety. Among those innovations were the automation of the police records room and of the patrol dispatching system, activities that once depended on pen and paper in a cumbersome process that slowed response to people in need of help.

However, Computer-Assisted Report Entry, or CARE, is the initiative that has attracted the most attention. One stubborn problem that did not immediately yield to Kleinknecht's determined probing was how to streamline the writing of reports. "Three days to 13 days was the amount of time it took to get a police report from a precinct to a detective," Kleinknecht recollected. "It became the police officer's worst responsibility." Officers would spend half an hour trying to talk a citizen out of making a complaint that would have required a 10-minute report. "I brought my senior people together and asked them to study how to change it, and they came back and said it could not be done. I told them to do it anyhow. Or so I am told." It was years after he took over that Kleinknecht tackled the problem head-on.

That is where Dennis George came in. Kleinknecht was looking for someone with the qualities he prizes in an employee. "Generally, I pick someone on the basis of his ability to work. Someone aggressive and willing to make mistakes. I will take this kind of person every day over someone who knows what to do, but can't make a decision. I want someone who will put in a 12-hour day, and argue with me if he thinks that I am wrong."

George fit the bill. "I was a field lieutenant," he said, "out on the street as a watch commander." In 1979 a friend in the department asked George if he would be interested in taking over as director of central police records, a job that previously had been a civilian position. He could take the job under what is termed "rank and assignment." That is, he could put his rank in escrow without jeopardizing his pay grade and benefits.

Blondish, ruddy, athletic, and 49, George explained his reaction to the possibility of a new position in the straightforward way characteristic of him. "I was happy for the change and wanted to take the job. Police work gets boring after a while, even if you are in a combat zone. Besides, I like the administrative stuff. It was a pay raise. I got a car to take home. It was straight days and weekends off, so I could see my kids playing sports."

He did realize that there would be problems. He was to be the supervisor of a unit that had the largest number of civilian employees in the department. "There is always some sort of tension between commissioned officers and civilians in a police department."

That tension was a major obstacle in the development of a computer-assisted report entry system, but George's civilian staff soon became the system's star performers and recipients of the highest praise from Kleinknecht.

FROM ONE INNOVATION TO THE NEXT

George sees CARE as but one of several integrated systems in his charge and a natural outgrowth of Kleinknecht's interest in information automation and his vision of how the department should employ new technologies. "One of the first things we automated was all the arrest records," George recalled. It took an enormous amount of time to do so, and Kleinknecht—who keeps current on developments in police administration by reading, communicating with his peers, and participating in national police organizations—was aware that other police departments were taking steps to cut the amount of time given to records maintenance. Getting information into computers immediately after a person was booked was one of Kleinknecht's objectives for the new system.

"Sometime after that," George said, "I think around 1981, he wanted to be able to respond faster to calls for service from citizens. He wanted to get the information to the police officer so he could get there as fast as possible."

The existing system did not even begin to achieve this objective. Calls were recorded with paper and pencil. If the person taking the call did not recognize the address, she would consult a map book, find the area, look up the beat number, write all this down, and put the card in a track that went to the dispatcher. "He thought this took too long and was life-threatening," George said.

As it happened, installing computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) required very little innovation. George took Minneapolis' system and modified it to suit his purposes. "We are very satisfied with it," he reported. "It cut response time dramatically and yielded all kinds of management information that you could never get from the old system."

"This was where we started," George said. "Using CAD as a building block, we developed CARE."

In his reading, Kleinknecht came across a report that said doctors were using the telephone to dictate their case notes and, as a result, were saving significant amounts of time. He thought such a reporting system could be adapted to police work. "We had found out that a police officer could use up to 20 percent of his time writing police reports," George said.

"And the cops hated it. My first sergeant would circle all the misspelled words with a red pen, so you had to do them over."

Having once borrowed and adapted an automated system from another police department, Kleinknecht and his staff tried to follow the same strategy with report writing. The Colonel identified police departments that were said to be working on improvements in this area, and he sent George and Julius Turner, the civilian in charge of data systems, out shopping. "We visited maybe six or seven police agencies trying to find a system we could buy," George recalled. "We couldn't find one we wanted. The problem was that they were vendor-dependent. A computer firm would set up a program then go out of business."

At least the trips showed George and Turner what not to look for in a system. "They all had problems," George said. One city had a system that wasn't really automated. Another had a backlog of 300,000 police reports that had not yet been entered into the machines. "They must have had 100 to 150 terminals with people behind them sitting there and doing their fingernails. I think they had a management problem. Cops could use the system or not. It was optional." The city with the best system was using reputable hardware, but its software had been produced by a company that had gone out of business. "No one in-house knew the system," George said. "So when it broke down, it stayed that way a long time."

DO IT YOURSELF

The two men returned to report that no other city's system suited their needs; if the department wanted a new computerized report entry system, it had to create the system itself. Turner had gotten estimates, and the cost was "astronomical." And yet their recommendation to Kleinknecht was, "if he still wanted to do it, we would have to write the programs ourselves. This would have the benefit of giving people ownership of the system and knowing it well enough to fix it when it broke."

Lack of appropriate technology was not the only problem George and Kleinknecht faced. "There is a long tradition of written reports in policing," George said. That tradition stretches back to the English constabulary, on which American police forces were based. Citizen-constables kept journals in which they recorded events that occurred on their night rounds. While Kleinknecht could—indeed, would—order the new reporting system into being, George knew that he would be the one who would have to sell it to his fellow police officers if they were actually to use it. "Police are tremendously bound to tradition," he said. In this effort, he employed two weapons: time and unceasing attention to detail.

George wasn't worried about patrol officers, who, under Kleinknecht, had become the backbone of the department. He sensed that they would welcome whatever released them from having to write those

hated reports. He was, however, worried about their superiors, the first sergeants and watch commanders, who had, for as long as anyone could remember, approved the written reports. A new reporting system, by taking them out of the loop, threatened their authority. They would resist the changes down the line. Kleinknecht, who displays great sensitivity to police culture, was not unaware of this danger.

George did not just have to worry about his uniformed colleagues. Julius Turner did not much like the idea of a new system either. Yet, because he was in charge of data systems, Turner was absolutely central to the plan's success. Kleinknecht thought Turner and others in administration worried that they would be blamed if the system did not work. "They also saw it as the first time that they had a great big project over which they did not have control. Field officers, patrol officers, would control it. It wasn't within their division and wouldn't help out their division."

Kleinknecht let Turner know that he was being held responsible for the system's success. Yet, while "might made right" in the paramilitary atmosphere of the police department, George understood instinctively that it could not prevail alone. Even with Kleinknecht's authority behind the new system, George still had to sell Turner and his staff on the idea.

He might not have been able to pull off the assignment had it not been for the third person on the working committee, Jeff Muel, a programmer, and in George's words, "a 21-year-old workaholic and computer whiz, very creative, very hard-working." The committee would make decisions one day, and Muel would produce an application the next.

NINETY-FIVE PERCENT PERSPIRATION

One of George's colleagues was cleaning out his desk in the middle of 1989 when he came across some Polaroid photographs—a memento of the days when CARE was being developed. So tense were relations between the project and the data systems division that when the group agreed on an important aspect of the plan, their agreement was written on a large chart sheet, signed by all involved, and photographed so that none of the participants could change or back out of the terms.

Finally, between bureaucratic battles, a plan was developed; it was the essence of simplicity. A patrol officer called in his report of a crime to a specially trained operator who, working off a checklist of questions developed for that particular offense, talked the officer through the report, entering the data on her computer. The victim of the crime, or a witness to it, could be put on the line to contribute additional information. Moreover, civilians with complaints could also make them over the telephone; thus, for less severe offenses, the department no longer had to dispatch an officer and a car to take the complaint and make the report.

Satisfied that they had at least the beginnings of a workable system, George became even more attentive to detail than he had been when the system was being developed. He knew he had his boss' support; he believed he would soon have the eager acceptance of the patrol officers. This, in Dennis George's way of doing things, was exactly the wrong time to get careless and speed up. "Ninety-five percent perspiration and 5 percent inspiration is a pretty good ratio for what we did," he recalled. People still had to be convinced.

"We had a plan for marketing the system within the department, and we rehearsed it over and over again," George recalled. In choosing telephone operators, the working committee selected civilians already in the department who had the typing skills and the other qualities they thought would make for successful operators. Then they trained them and trained them some more. They decided not to apply the system to the detective division, which did not like the idea, and to limit its initial use to patrol officers investigating property crimes.

CARE SELLS ITSELF

The working committee chose one platoon in the department to be the first to adopt the system. "We played 'Call In a Police Report' with them," George said. The game showed the patrol officers that the system was on their side. They filed complete, legible reports with no information missing. They didn't need a pen. And all the words were spelled right. Soon, George said, operators were discovering that patrol officers were calling in reports on other than property crimes. "The officer would say this was a property crime, and half way through, the operator would discover it was really an assault." Soon, the other platoons were demanding that they be given the system and training in its use. Even the detective division wanted it.

George had been right. The idea would sell itself if marketed properly. "Had it failed, the reason would have been failure to plan," he said later. "The idea was bulletproof. It would only fail if we let it fail. We sold it to this core that we hand-selected. Then they became salesmen."

Yet such is the police culture that all along the interest had been mixed with a fundamental reluctance to change. "Even after you have a successful program, even after we got the innovations award, people I talked to in other cities were searching for reasons not to do it; for reasons why it wouldn't work in their communities." Still, the word got out that it did work. By the autumn of 1989, roughly 90 cities had expressed interest in CARE. George and Kleinknecht enjoy watching other departments get interested in their program. "Larger police departments find it hard to sit still hearing from a small, midwestern department," George said. "But if they listen, soon you see the light go on."

An officer telephones the station about the case he has been investigating. Computerized reporting saves hours of police time.

Kleinknecht and George have attempted to extract the maximum return from the work they have done on CARE. Seeking to recoup the costs of developing the system, the department sent invitations to major computer hardware companies to respond to a deal: provide the St. Louis County police department with low-cost hardware in exchange for receiving the right to market its software programs to other police departments.

The upshot is that a software marketing firm, Pioneer, is now selling the second generation of CARE software, which will run on several of the larger computers, to departments throughout the country. A customer pays $25,000, all of which goes to the St. Louis County Police Department. Pioneer has a parallel agreement with Motorola to market its computers to these customers. Motorola pays Pioneer and gives the St. Louis County department its new computers at cost. Gil Kleinknecht thinks he has made a good deal.

SOURCES OF INNOVATION

What conditions or attitudes encouraged innovation in St. Louis County? George is reticent at first, but when he warms to the topic of innovation, his blue eyes darken, and he becomes animated. Waste, it becomes clear, is something that George hates as much as Kleinknecht does. But waste brings on the conditions that foster innovation. "Somewhere along the line you run out of money. Police departments have run into caps on their budgets. Now, they must listen to better, cheaper ways of protecting the public."

Colonel Kleinknecht thinks zero-base budgeting is responsible for his employees' creativity. It does not permit them to assume that anything happening now will continue into the next budget cycle unless its continuation can be justified. This constraint makes a difference, he says, along with his continual repetition of two fundamental questions: "How can we do it better and cheaper?" "What would you do if it were your own money?" And he frequently reminds his staff, "I don't care what you did yesterday."

Not only does Kleinknecht employ management techniques such as zero-base budgeting, but he also keeps clearly before him a very untraditional mission statement. His department is there, he said, to protect people's lives and property, not to be protective of its own institutional interests. This philosophy finds expression in virtually everything Kleinknecht does.

For instance, in most police departments, appointment to the detective ranks is considered a plum. Under Kleinknecht, St. Louis County police have a policy that someone can be a detective for only five years and then has to go back on patrol. "Our basic premise is that patrol

is where basic law enforcement is done," he says. Much to the same purpose, the Colonel transfers department majors to different duties every two or three years.

It may be this knack for never losing sight of first premises that prompted Kleinknecht to say that the most important element of the CARE program is the people—people like Jeff Muel, for instance, who designed the computer programs that operate the system, and the people who take the police calls and operate the computers. The operators, four out of five of whom are women, have a special place in Kleinknecht's regard. "They are well trained, and they do a good job. With experience, they have come to be able to pass on information to the officer. For instance, one will take a report on a break-in from an officer and tell him that she took a break-in report from a neighboring precinct the night before in which a similar M.O. was used. Or she will listen to a victim's description of his assailant and notice that it matches the description of the assailant in another crime."

George noted that the CARE project "spurred other innovations from people in the department you never would have thought of as innovators. Other people had ideas to try."

What incentives does Kleinknecht offer his people to be innovative? "Personal satisfaction. Promotion." Those who succeed not only receive a leg up the career ladder, he said. "They also have the knowledge that when they are proven performers, they can come to me and ask for something they need and I will give it to them."

Kleinknecht was surprised when asked what he would have done if Dennis George had not succeeded with the CARE experiment. After thinking for a moment, he replied, "If he gave me his very best, I'd have given him another project." All Kleinknecht expects, he said, is that people in his department try their best.

SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN

CHAPTER

5

The spacious sanctuary of the modern New Morning Star Missionary Baptist Church in Peoria, Illinois, is filled with the sound of an inspirational duet, accompanied by the church's organist. The pastor of New Morning Star, the Reverend Cleveland Thomas, has already welcomed the group assembled, who occupy nearly two-thirds of the pews. The presence of Bishop Harold Dawson, pastor of nearby New Hope Church of Deliverance, suggests this is not just a routine event. Later, Peoria Mayor James Maloof will sing the Lord's Prayer in a voice rich in tonal quality. Visibly moved by the music, the listeners will heartily applaud both the duet and the solo.

A casual observer might conclude that this is a cooperative worship service sponsored by a group of Peoria churches. A battery of cameras in front of the chancel provides the only clue to what it actually is—a press conference. It was organized by the Illinois board of directors of One Church–One Child, a unique organization with a name that defines its mission: to encourage every black church in Illinois to find one family willing to adopt a black child.* The press conference is a regular feature of the board's bimonthly meetings. There have been scores of such meetings, held in about a dozen cities throughout Illinois, over the past decade.

NEW DIRECTOR SEEKS A LONG-DEFERRED SOLUTION

One Church–One Child came into existence as a result of a crisis in the Illinois adoption system in the 1970s. In 1979 in Cook County, of which Chicago is a part, 702 of the 1,000 children eligible for adoption were black—70 percent of the waiting list out of a general population that was 26 percent black. Throughout the state there were waiting lists of white

*A case study written by Anna M. Warnock contributed significantly to the authors' understanding of this program and provided valuable information they used in tracing its history and development. The study was prepared under the direction of Marc Zegans and Alan Altshuler, for use at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

This young girl found a loving family thanks to new state adoption policies and practices developed through One Church–One Child.

couples seeking to adopt white children, but black children often spent years in foster homes, waiting on average two and one-half times longer than white children for adoptive parents.

Because the problem was so serious it quickly moved to the top of the agenda of Gregory Coler, who had become director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 1978 after distinguished service in New York state government. Coler, who is white, concluded that the department should turn to the black community for a solution. His deputy, Gordon Johnson, who is black, concurred.

Unfortunately, in part because of its responsibilities under the law, the DCFS had acquired a bad reputation in the black community. As the agency charged with investigating complaints of abuse and neglect, DCFS officials sometimes found themselves accused of "snooping." As the agency charged with removing at-risk children from their parents' custody, officials had also sometimes been accused of "child-snatching." Moreover, the service-delivery style of the adoption staff sometimes caused irritation. Some were seen as rigid in their interpretation of child-placement criteria, criteria that had the effect of excluding some potential black adoptive parents (for example, those with apartments of modest size).

Under pressure to increase the adoption rates for black infants, the DCFS staff had placed some children in interracial homes outside of Illinois. The practice not only angered blacks in Cook County but also ran counter to a resolution adopted in 1979 by the National Association of Black Social Workers opposing adoption of black children by whites. Clearly, barriers of fear and resentment had to be overcome before the DCFS could mount a program to recruit adoptive parents for black children.

THE STATE FINDS A POWERFUL ALLY

John Casey, then Executive Director of the Illinois Legislature's Advisory Committee on Public Aid, suggested that the DCFS involve black churches in black adoptions.

Why the black church? Gary Morgan, Associate Deputy Director of the DCFS, finds part of the answer in the writings of W. E. B. DuBois, noted black historian and social scientist. DuBois wrote: "The Negro church is the only social institution of the Negroes which . . . has survived slavery. . . . It is natural therefore that charitable and rescue work among Negroes should first be found in the churches and reach there its greatest development."* Richard Maye, a Springfield, Illinois, pastor who is on the board of One Church–One Child, calls the church a "social outlet. It's a psychiatrist. It's a physician, because blacks were not treated by physicians

*Quoted in *Children of the Storm: Black Children and American Child Welfare* by Andrew Billingsley and Jeanne M. Giovanni. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.

in their towns. It's everything to the people who gather there."

Involving the black church meant involving its ministers, who are a vital force in the African-American community. The Reverend James Hargett, another Illinois clergyman, describes the black pastor as the "gatekeeper" to his community, managing the flow of information and ideas and counseling families faced with major decisions.

Recognizing the potential value of cooperation between the DCFS and these ministers, Coler and Johnson proposed to Father George Clements, pastor of the largest black Roman Catholic parish in Chicago, that they work together to increase the number of adoptions by black families. Father Clements, who had been active in civil rights and social issues, was skeptical at first. He recalled previous arrangements in which government involvement in the African-American community had failed to bring promised results. Coler pledged that the DCFS staff would follow through on the administrative changes needed to make a black adoption program work, a commitment that apparently impressed Father Clements and seems to have weighed heavily in his positive response. Eventually convinced of the sincerity of the DCFS administrators, he enlisted a group of like-minded Protestant clergymen, who became the nucleus of the board of One Church–One Child.

A BIPARTISAN EFFORT OVERHAULS ADOPTION LAWS

Before the director and his chief aide could make needed administrative changes, however, they had to spur the legislature to revamp the state's adoption laws, and they had to convince Governor James Thompson to approve funds to administer the program. Because fiscal constraints overshadowed most state policy decisions in the early 1980s, the DCFS administrators argued that by increasing the number of adoptions Illinois would realize substantial savings.

They reviewed the facts. A child in foster care cost the state $3,390 per year. Even with a program providing $2,035 a year to encourage families to adopt handicapped or children with special needs (a category that included many minority children), cost savings of $1,355 per child could be achieved simply by getting children out of foster care and into adoptive homes. The argument worked. In 1981, while proposing that spending for other departments be held level or cut, Governor Thompson introduced a fiscal 1982 budget that increased funding for the adoption program by 25 percent.

Working with a bipartisan committee on child-welfare policy, Coler devised legislation to overhaul the adoption process. One bill provided that foster parents automatically be given first option to adopt the children in their care. Another measure—designed to reduce long delays in which abused, neglected, or unwanted children were shunted from one home to

another—permitted the DCFS to start proceedings to terminate biological parents' legal rights even before the agency had located adoptive parents. Its bipartisan sponsorship alone would have made the package of proposals a candidate for prompt legislative approval, but dramatic action by Father Clements, the first president of One Church–One Child's board, undoubtedly helped reduce any remaining opposition.

FATHER CLEMENTS SETS AN EXAMPLE

Father Clements had urged his flock for months to adopt black children. Frustrated by their failure to respond, he finally announced from the pulpit that he planned to adopt a child himself. Although it had been clear from the outset that the ministers would not be silent partners in the program, nobody had expected this level of commitment. Just as the Chicago-area pilot program was getting under way, the dynamic priest not only brought the issue to the attention of his congregation, but he also attracted print, radio, and television coverage in Chicago, around the United States, and abroad.

SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN

Father Clements' adoption of 13-year-old Joey, long-time resident of an orphanage, riveted public attention on how inordinately long black children were trapped in the foster-care system. A *Chicago Tribune* editorial declared, "Rarely do human emotions, good economics, and good sense combine so strongly in favor of quick legislative action."

Even before the legislation passed, Coler and Johnson began to make changes to remove impediments to adoption by black families and to make the adoption bureaucracy more responsive. "We went through upheavals in the entire adoption system," Johnson recalls. "We did it through hammering away and beating down and rewarding and punishing. Some drastic changes were made in regulations to make it easier for families to adopt children. To adopt children under the old regulations you had to have a two-parent family; you had to live in a house." Social workers who went through the houses of prospective parents used to look into refrigerators and check under the beds, "all those crazy things," he said.

CHANGING A COMPLACENT BUREAUCRACY

Coler and Johnson faced a major challenge in restructuring the adoption service. It was one of the most deeply entrenched bureaucracies in the DCFS. Senior workers, most of whom were white, claimed these coveted jobs. "You worked 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. five days a week and you knew exactly what you were going to do every day," said Janis Forte, special assistant to Johnson and staff director of the One Church–One Child board. "You found kids nice, neat homes, and you gave someone a baby, and everybody loved you."

The redirected program forced changes in routine; staff had to work more flexible hours and respond to new challenges. Some senior workers resisted these changes. They feared losing their right to exercise judgment; they questioned letting black ministers control adoption presentations; they mistrusted the religious cast to the program. Misunderstandings were not limited to veteran white workers. Some black staff members also resisted working with the ministers. A number of the mostly female DCFS staff, especially women in supervisory positions, found the mainstream Baptist church culture to be hierarchical and patriarchal, one in which women were forbidden to speak from the pulpit or even wear pants.

Staff had to be flexible in organizing audio-visual briefings on the adoption process. These presentations might be scheduled at a special midweek meeting or as part of a three-hour Sunday service. Staff responsibilities were different, more limited than previously. Forte recalled, "We'd go out there early, sometimes the day before, to help set up the hall. We learned to carry extension cords and extra light bulbs for the projectors." Some staff found the required changes too inhibiting and left their jobs, to be replaced by people whose commitment to the new procedures was a condition of employment.

As staff made the job adjustments, they came to see for the first time that ingrained patterns, not explicit regulations, had worked to exclude working-class black parents from adoption. As their resistance to change diminished, and because they realized the One Church–One Child program was meant to break new ground, staff felt compelled to reexamine old practices. They became more flexible, recognizing that in the past applicants who "didn't seem too bright" or "weren't so educated" were often unfairly screened out by culturally biased standards or subjective judgments. Regulations governing space requirements, including specifications for a minimum number of rooms, were adapted to conform to housing realities in black, inner-city neighborhoods.

As Coler and Johnson revamped the bureaucracy, the black ministers were becoming more adept at motivating prospective parents. They often found themselves countering such economic arguments as "The family budget is already strained; we can't add another mouth to feed." Father Clements tried to quell such fears in his congregation by reminding couples that their grandparents had willingly taken in homeless children during the Great Depression, a time of unprecedented deprivation. He and his Protestant counterparts tried to rekindle the spirit of community that had existed when implacable racial segregation and widespread poverty had forced African-American communities to "take care of their own."

CHICAGO PROGRAM SHOWS RESULTS

By the middle of 1982 the One Church–One Child approach was showing measurable results. In the first full year of operation the number of black children in Cook County awaiting adoption dropped from 702 to 400.

In October 1982 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services gave DCFS a $150,000 grant to help extend the One Church–One Child program throughout Illinois. As the program went statewide, regional staff were given training and orientation of the kind offered by the Cook County pilot project. The number of regional staff assigned to adoption was increased from 61 to 129. Janis Forte and Gary Morgan, assigned to train staff to work with the black church statewide, faced some of the same kind of skepticism and resistance they had encountered in the pilot program. Now, however, they were able to allay doubts and anxieties by citing the dramatic decreases in the number of children awaiting adoption in Cook County.

In its expansion throughout Illinois, the One Church–One Child program retained a high public profile. Board meetings became media events. Information about children available for adoption was presented to the congregation and other community residents at evening meetings in the host church. Awards were presented to an adoptive family or to journalists for their coverage of adoption issues.

Throughout the 1980s placement rates for black children continued to rise both in Chicago and downstate. In 1983 the number of children waiting in Cook County was again cut in half, to 212. By 1984 it was cut to 113, and by December 1986 only 39 black children were waiting for adoption. In the rest of the state, that number dropped from an estimated 310 in 1980 to 147 in 1986. In 1989 the monthly average number of black children awaiting adoption fluctuated between 125 and 165 statewide and between 45 and 65 in Cook County.

Today DCFS staff work the telephones for days before meetings, calling lists of members of the congregation provided by the ministers, using a professional telemarketing strategy that includes persistent follow-up calls when they fail to get answers to initial calls. On meeting days they help organize car pools to get people to the meetings and to shuttle board members from their hotels to the host church.

HOW ONE CHURCH PLAYS IN PEORIA

The Peoria meeting demonstrates the strong impact that One Church–One Child can have on an Illinois community. It also reveals the high level of cooperation between state officials and church leaders that is one of the program's particular strengths.

In Peoria, as he has done in Champaign, Chicago, Decatur, Cairo, and elsewhere at the request of the ministers, Gordon Johnson presides at

Father George Clements, a founding board member of the One Church–One Child program, with one of his three adopted sons.

a press conference. He explains the concept of One Church–One Child, noting that the partnership between the State of Illinois and black churches has made it possible for more than 3,000 children to be adopted since the program was created in 1981. He outlines the non-salaried services of the board members in promoting the program's objectives in all regions of the state and describes the legislative and administrative steps the state has taken to simplify and shorten the adoption process. Then, after he has presented awards to a Peoria television producer for a series of shows on adoption and accepted the keys to the city from Mayor James Maloof, he fields a series of polite questions from the reporters.

It is apparent that the relationship between Johnson and the board of clergymen, who have been sitting behind him throughout the press conference, is based on genuine mutual regard; their rapport is evident. He respects the ministers for the influence they have in their churches and communities. They respect him for his ability to communicate the One Church–One Child message to wider audiences.

When the clergymen excuse themselves to reconvene the board meeting in the adjoining banquet hall, the tone of the reporters' questions to Johnson shifts. They are interested in hard news—recent DCFS cases that have attracted media attention. Johnson responds with the same ease he demonstrated before.

As is apparent when the 30-second sound bite of his press conference appears that night, the television cameras like him. Marshall McLuhan, the late media analyst, would have said he was a "cool" man. Schooled in eastern colleges and universities and possessed of a world view formed in part by graduate study and research in the social sciences, Johnson appears to be as comfortable in the New Morning Star pulpit as he is in the office of Governor James Thompson.

The press conference in the New Morning Star Church is only one aspect of this two-day meeting. The evening program includes a community forum, a standard event of these bimonthly meetings, usually preceded or followed by a dinner. The forum conveys the One Church–One Child message not just to the congregation, but to the entire host community.

RECALLING THE LONG ARM OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY

In the Peoria community forum, Dr. Shelvin Hall, current president of the One Church–One Child board, describes the powerful church-oriented networks that once sheltered and guided residents of black communities in his native Yoakum, Texas. In Yoakum, as in many Southern areas, says Hall, children learned that they had "many relatives [who] were not kin." This network—the extended family in today's parlance—had full parenting authority, including the authority to spank errant youngsters.

This chain provided a benign surveillance over the youngsters, among whom was "a boy who was eager and energetic."

If he went to Sand Town, somebody would see him. If he went to East Hill somebody would be looking at him. If he went to Beth Elder, somebody knew whose son he was. So they kept him on a straight and narrow pathway. . . . There was always somebody concerned. . . . The thing we had was a sense of community, that we belonged to somebody. And the black kid that grows up in the city now doesn't belong to anybody. He's not about to let you boss his life because he doesn't belong to you. The tragedy of this is that he is that much weaker because he does not belong to somebody. I come begging you that we again stretch out the bonds of love to recreate those bonds of kinship.

Hall and his colleagues have never been under the illusion that neighborhoods in Chicago and other Illinois cities could be recast in the mold of Yoakum, Texas. But they continue to emphasize children's need for a family, the black church as a refuge and source of guidance, and the black community's sense of cohesion.

No one envisioned when this public-private relationship was formed the degree to which it would become an engine of change both in state government and in the black church.

The social services bureaucracy of a major industrial state has significantly modified its policies, its procedures, and its operating assumptions through its working partnership with the black churches. And as a result it has been able substantially to improve its reputation in and its effectiveness with the state's African-American population. No mean feat.

Meanwhile, for the clergymen, the partnership has added a new dimension to their ministry. Close involvement with the DCFS has for the first time given the ministers an entree to the cabinet level of state government. It has also prompted them to reexamine the role of their churches in supporting other social service programs. Some have expanded their counseling and day-care services. Says Dr. Louis Rawls, for 41 years pastor of a South Side Baptist church that has built an 11-story apartment building on a lot adjoining the church, "This program has caused us to look again at ourselves in our relationship, not just to the spirit, but to the physical man and the whole family."

That responsibility, many of the black clergymen now conclude, extends—beyond giving comfort and dispensing charity—to taking part in the formation of the secular social policies that help shape the lives of their people. This they now see as an important part of caring for "the physical man and the whole family."

Gordon Johnson has suggested that the ties being forged between the black ministers and public officials may transcend local and regional

politics. "Their participation in this state program has become a platform for [them] nationally," he said.

In 1984 the federal Department of Health and Human Services gave Illinois $50,000 to inform child-welfare officials in other states about the One Church–One Child program. This grant, paired with the subsequent award of $100,000 from the Ford Foundation, helped the Illinois staff launch a dissemination program that has spread the One Church–One Child approach to 26 states and the District of Columbia. Representatives of these spinoffs met in Orlando in 1989 for the third annual One Church–One Child national conference.

Gordon Johnson will send his training staff only to those states in which his cabinet-level counterpart makes a firm commitment to the program. With this commitment tendered, he dispatches Janis Forte and Gary Morgan for a three-day session designed to train state adoption staff. The carefully honed training packages include detailed information: diagrams for seating in assembly halls along with instructions to staff about the logistics of meetings—what kinds of equipment are needed, even down to the number of rolls of tape to have on hand. The sessions usually conclude with a press conference introducing the new program.

The results have varied. In some states, the ministers have not been able to establish the kind of rapport the Illinois ministers have attained with agency personnel. In others, the effort has flagged for lack of guidance from the state agencies, although Forte and Morgan have been generous in telephone "hand-holding."

THE PROGRAM IS FIRMLY INSTITUTIONALIZED

Meanwhile, back in Illinois, One Church–One Child is facing some changes. The board may have to forge new relationships with a different group of officials in the DCFS. Governor Thompson, who championed the alliance between the state and black churches, has decided not to run for reelection, and his successor will have a different cabinet and, possibly, different priorities.

Yet, whatever the composition of state government, Gordon Johnson can foresee no real threat to the survival of the program. First of all, he noted, One Church–One Child is a corporate entity, not an agency of state government. Furthermore, he said, it has tremendous momentum as well as friends in the state legislature and the private sector, and it has a track record that should insulate it from political fluctuations.

Against these external changes, some internal changes are afoot, which may somewhat alter the priorities of One Church–One Child. As Dr. Hall's term as president of the board came to an end he called on the older generation on the board to relinquish leadership to younger clergy.

Among those who have recently joined the board is Father John

Smyth, who supervises Maryville City of Youth, Chicago's largest institution for treatment of narcotics addiction. At Maryville, volunteers work in shifts, holding babies to soothe them from the pain of the sudden withdrawal birth has inflicted on them. Smyth's addition to the board underscores its concern about the alarming increase in babies born with their mothers' addiction to narcotics. Recent statistics, presented to the board by the DCFS staff, show that of 108,000 children in families legally subject to agency investigation, 43 percent can be classified as victims of child abuse or neglect.

Father Smyth, a Roman Catholic priest, is also the first white clergyman to sit on the board. His appointment is a response to the rise in the number of non-black children experiencing increasingly longer waits for adoptive parents.

Finally, Father Clements, the board's first president, is asking some fundamental questions about the future direction of the program. Although he has remained on the board of One Church–One Child, Clements' attendance at meetings has declined and his role in policy making has diminished. Father Clements has told fellow pastors that he feels the board has relinquished too much responsibility to state officials for setting the organization's agenda. Furthermore, he believes, attention to the group's basic mission—promoting adoptions—has been distracted by other activities.

The board of One Church–One Child has before it a number of decisions that will affect its activities over the next decade, but whatever its choices, close observers say, the program seems sufficiently resilient to adjust to changes in style and is sufficiently committed to finding homes for children to keep style from obscuring substance.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AND JIUJITSU IN GEORGIA

CHAPTER

6

Federal Judge Anthony Alaimo probably was not thinking about innovation in 1974 when he ruled in the case of *Guthrie* v. *Ault* that the Georgia State Prison in Reedsville was seriously overcrowded and that the prison must remain under his jurisdiction until the state alleviated that condition. Yet, for the better part of a decade—until overcrowding could be reduced and the prison finally returned to state jurisdiction—Judge Alaimo's ruling would preoccupy the Georgia Department of Corrections and serve as a stimulus to innovation in the entire corrections system.

The result, in addition to improved conditions in Reedsville, was an array of alternatives to incarceration. In five years, these alternatives have saved the state an estimated $150 million and have taken pressure off a prison system that otherwise would have burst at the seams. Moreover, the program has written a new chapter in the history of American penology. Since the program offers judges a flexible range of sentencing options, they are better able to select a punishment that fits the crime, reserving incarceration for offenses serious enough to merit it while still meting out appropriate punishments for lesser offenses.

At least 20 other states have embraced one or more of these five cost-effective alternatives to putting offenders in prison. The program has received considerable attention from the national media and has done much to boost the department's stock with the governor and the legislature.

FROM CHAIN GANG TO MODEL PENOLOGY

All in all, not bad for a state whose reputation for chain-gang penology was not entirely undeserved as recently as 15 years ago.

David C. Evans, who became Commissioner of the Department of Corrections in 1976, contends that it was the severe overcrowding in Georgia prisons, not the Guthrie decision itself, that pushed state

Community service, one of Georgia's alternatives to prison, puts offenders to work to benefit society, as here, cleaning roadside areas.

government to act. However, he concedes that the court decision helped him and his department obtain from the Georgia legislature the funding and political support necessary to alleviate the problem.

"It was clear to me," Evans recalled, "that we would never be able to build our way out of the problem. This is not a new thought now. It was a new thought then." For one thing, a national economic recession had just caught up with Georgia, and the state did not have the money to build enough new prisons—typically one of the most expensive forms of architecture—to accommodate the growing numbers being sentenced by Georgia's courts. Besides, David Evans was personally opposed to putting money into bricks and mortar when it could be used to keep the economic activity it represented, as well as the offenders, in the state's communities.

It was not, however, David Evans or then-Governor George Busbee or any of the people working for them who decided who went to jail or whose sentence was suspended in favor of a term on probation. The ones with that discretion were the judges in the state's 45 judicial circuits (which are organized into 10 judicial districts). Elected rather than appointed, the circuit judges were and are acutely responsive to public opinion about crime and punishment, and that opinion was and is unequivocal—people who commit crimes must be made to pay the penalty. An offender allowed to stay at home and receive periodic visits from a probation officer was not "paying." Short of the death sentence, prison was considered the only acceptable form of punishment.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Georgia had one of the highest incarceration rates in the world—ahead of South Africa's, ahead of the Soviet Union's—although its crime rate was at or below the U.S. average. Incarceration had always been cheaper in the South than in much of the rest of the country because of the region's comparatively mild climate and because Southern prisons required inmates to work outside prison walls. But added to these economic considerations were cultural and legal traditions that encouraged long jail sentences. In some ways theology played a bigger role than criminology or sociology in judicial sentencing in Georgia. Judges had no uniform sentencing laws or guidelines; where one judge handed down a one-year sentence for burglary, another could mete out 20 years. From the judges to the district attorneys to the police chiefs, the entire system was oriented toward incarceration.

Prior to the Guthrie decision, according to Vince Fallin, Deputy Commissioner for Probation, the state had never really taken a close look at its prison population and its prison system or at those of comparable jurisdictions. If it had it might have simply surrendered. Hemmed in on all sides by intractable absolutes—escalating numbers of people sentenced, obdurate public opinion, judicial caution, and a shrinking exchequer—

Evans and his staff were in a no-win situation. But Evans' reaction was the opposite of giving up. "I get excited when I am told that something can't be done," he said.

Beyond the negatives, there were a handful of positives. Georgia has a single, unitary corrections and probation system for adults. That is, counties play only such roles as the state chooses to delegate to them. The system would respond to centrally dictated changes, and those changes would not have to be negotiated with another level of government. Moreover, a reasonably good probation system was in place, staffed by a cadre of bright, well educated, mostly younger people.

VINCE FALLIN

Vince Fallin was one of that cadre. He majored in sociology and psychology in college and quickly settled on a career in probation. Early on, he ran a diversion center in Cobb County. Georgia's diversion centers were created as part of a federal initiative aimed at securing restitution from criminals for their victims. Patterned on restitution centers in Wisconsin and Minnesota and funded by a grant from the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Georgia's first centers were located in Rome, Gainesville, and Athens. After getting good national evaluations for its adaptation of the program, the state started putting its own money into these centers. Their names were changed, successively, from restitution centers to adjustment centers to diversion centers in response to the country's increasingly hard-line attitudes toward crime, punishment, and rehabilitation.

It did not take a genius to figure out that getting the state's political and judicial establishment and its voters to accept some form of punishment for criminals other than prison was the cost-effective solution to its prison overcrowding problem. Vince Fallin may not be a genius, but he is a professional probation officer who is also adept at getting people to accept new ideas. He realized that what faced the Department of Corrections—along with the problem of program design—was the problem of how to market change in the corrections system. The first step in marketing, he reasoned, was to find out what the people in the market wanted or would accept at a minimum. So, he went out and asked the judges, the district attorneys, and the police chiefs—but chiefly the judges—what it would take to get them to sentence felons to some form of punishment other than prison.

Vince Fallin stands out but is not threatening. Tall and fit, at 44 he has snow white hair that sets off a healthy tan. He talks like the professional he is, but with animation, and he can communicate effectively with people of traditional style and values. People respond well to him,

and the judges he visited were no exception. They answered his questions, but what they told him may not have been what he and his colleagues wanted to hear.

First, any alternative to prison would have to be tough and, in keeping with the tenor of the times, look tough so as to protect judges from charges of coddling criminals. That is, criminals would have to be punished for their deeds in a way that let the public know they were being punished, not detained in country-club environments. Second, the alternative would have to protect the public from violent criminals and the judiciary from charges of unleashing them on innocent victims. Third, it would have to exact justice from the criminal. Fourth, it would have to be cheap.

The list did not include two objectives important to Vince Fallin and other experts in penology and probation: providing justice to criminals, as well as exacting justice from them, and rehabilitating them. These goals were important to Vince Fallin. Georgia's alternatives to incarceration would make it easier for these goals, too, to be met.

"GRADUALLY INCREASING BANDS OF CONTROL"

It is tempting to think of Georgia's alternatives to incarceration as parts of a well-crafted plan that sprang full blown from the collective brow of its creators, especially since these programs have become what Billie Erwin, the department's chief of evaluation, calls "a continuum that could be described as gradually increasing bands of control." But the program didn't start that way.

The process of innovation was not intentional, Vince Fallin cheerfully admits. It progressed as people and time were available to carry it along. What Fallin and his colleagues did is what a private-sector research and development team might have done. They undertook to design workable programs, but they also concentrated on finding programs that would meet market demand.

Since they worked in probations, it is not surprising that the first program they devised was a new, tougher kind of probation. Called "intensive probation supervision," it was specifically designed to please the judiciary. Gradually, the group developed other sentencing options to fill the continuum between no punishment on one extreme and prison on the other. In ascending order of severity, these alternatives are basic probation, community service, intensive probation supervision, diversion centers, detention centers, and special alternative, or shock, incarceration.

BASIC PROBATION. In 1988 almost 121,000 Georgians were sentenced to probation. Roughly 33 percent were sentenced for misdemeanors; 7 percent for failure to pay child support; and the remaining 60 percent for felonies.

The least dramatic of the Georgia alternatives to incarceration, basic probation is nevertheless the cornerstone on which the others rest; without it, the others would not be possible.

The department's probation division has developed a sophisticated classification system that corrections officials believe permits them to determine the amount of surveillance, degree of treatment, and frequency of contact an individual probationer requires to complete his or her sentence; 86 percent of probationers did so successfully in 1988. Supervision ranges from weekly to monthly contact with one of the 715 probation officers stationed in 115 field offices.

Probation officers also conduct pre-sentence investigations for the courts, and they collect child-support payments, fines, and any probation fees the judge imposes to offset probation costs. In 1988 these costs amounted to 75 cents per day per probationer, or $273 per year, compared to the annual cost of $13,450 for imprisonment.

COMMUNITY SERVICE. Georgia's community service program, which has existed in some counties since the early 1970s, is a leftover of the federally funded "symbolic restitution" program. In 1983, after the first of the innovative programs—intensive probation supervision—was up and running, the department decided to expand community service with the stated goal of helping the offender while compensating his victim and the community. The program's visibility—probationers cleaning roadsides, painting small-town libraries, constructing community buildings—was catnip to judges. Voters could see that the justice system was exacting retribution from criminals in no small part thanks to the exertions of Judge A, B, or C, whose candidacy for reelection was not unlikely. For similar reasons, the program was attractive to the Department of Corrections. Among those citizens observing community service in action were state legislators regularly called upon to vote on the corrections budget. Moreover, the agencies eligible to receive assistance under the program (some 1,500 by 1989) also liked and supported it.

The department estimated that in 1988 community-service probationers logged 1.4 million hours of work. Conservatively valued at the $3.35 per hour minimum wage, the program netted services worth almost $5 million, which more than offset its cost—mostly the salaries of the men and women who act as coordinators between the probation system and the agencies served. Judicial acceptance of community service as an alternative to incarceration is evidenced in the growth in the number of coordinators—from 10 in 1983 to 45 in 1987—and in the number of offenders sentenced to community service—from 798 in 1983 to 8,410 in 1986.

INTENSIVE PROBATION SUPERVISION. Intensive probation supervision (IPS) first appeared in a concept paper in 1981, after Fallin had conducted his survey of the judges. The IPS pilot program was launched the following year in 13 judicial circuits and was so popular that by the end of the year the judges urged that it be expanded to 33 jurisdictions. By 1986 it was available in 38 of the state's 45 judicial circuits.

In David Jordan's words, "intensive probation supervision is a tough form of probation which entails highly structured, rigidly monitored supervision." It is at this level in the continuum that Billie Erwin's bands of control begin to tighten. A team, made up of a probation officer and one or two surveillance officers, makes nearly daily contact with each of the probationers in a caseload limited to no more than 55; sometimes the team supervises as few as 25. Probationers must have full-time employment and pay a fee that covers the cost of their supervision as well as court costs. They are subjected to random alcohol and drug screening tests, must undergo court-ordered treatment and counseling if the team says so, must complete at least 132 hours of community service, and are subject to mandatory curfews and travel restrictions. After serving six months to a year in IPS, the offender is handed over to basic probation.

The program is open to nonviolent felons whose needs are greater than those addressed under basic probation, but who do not require the kind of supervision provided under other, more severe sentencing options, including diversion centers, shock incarceration, and, finally, prison.

In 1987 the department's evaluation staff conducted a review of IPS and its effectiveness. They found that:

- Eighty-four percent of the high-risk probationers in the program were successfully maintained on probation. Revocation of probation was higher (16 percent) than for regular probation, but the amount of serious crime committed after release by IPS graduates was lower than the comparable rates for those sentenced either to prison or to regular probation.
- Drug offenders had the highest rate of success (87 percent completion of intensive probation).
- IPS "participants" were, in profile, more like the prison population than basic probationers; the program could therefore be seen as a means of diverting offenders from prison.
- The per capita cost of IPS for the period served was $6,000 less than for a similar stay in prison. (The department calculates that the average annual cost of IPS, over and above what the offender pays in fees, is $1,713 compared to $13,450 for imprisonment.)

IPS handles 1,335 probationers at a given time—2,300 per year. That judges—even "hanging" judges—have come to accept and use the program is shown by the increased number of IPS sentences. Because they have a sense of having been involved in designing the program, many judges have a sense of "ownership" in the program. Vince Fallin said it is not unusual for them to defend this and other alternatives to imprisonment from political attack and to urge their state legislators to vote generous appropriations for IPS and the other alternatives.

DIVERSION CENTERS. The Evans administration increased the number of diversion centers and encouraged judges to use them as alternatives to incarceration. The 12 centers (one of which is devoted to female prisoners) are targeted at nonviolent felons 17 years old and older but will take nonfelons as well. Each inmate must make a contract with the director of the center setting forth the personal goals he expects to achieve, how he will behave, and what he can expect from the center. This, according to James Fletcher, the charismatic black director of the Griffin Diversion Center, is the key to the diversion centers' success in rehabilitating offenders, or, as he prefers to call it, restoring them to dignity.

Inmates are not locked up in diversion centers. They are, however, constantly supervised, and privacy is not in abundant supply. Inmates are required to have gainful employment, which is solicited for them by the center staff; they must pay room and board, make restitution for their crimes, support their dependents, pay any court-ordered obligations, and complete between 30 and 50 hours of community service. The annual cost to keep an offender in a center, above and beyond the amount of money he or she pays the state, is $3,543, roughly one-fourth of what it costs to keep an offender in prison.

DETENTION CENTERS. Detention centers are Georgia's newest alternative to incarceration. The story of their development indicates the degree to which the once-reluctant Georgia state legislature has changed its stance toward the Department of Corrections.

About 100,000 people are on probation in Georgia at any given time. Roughly 4 percent of them have their probation revoked, usually for violating the terms of their probation rather than for committing any new crimes. In Vince Fallin's discussions with the judges, who are both his partners and customers, they "got the idea that they would like to have centers near them where they could put probation violators, something like county work camps," low-security residential environments for nonviolent offenders. The centers also are places to send habitual drunk drivers, whose crime the state appears to be intent on punishing. Inmates must work, and they bear the same financial and community-service obligations as prisoners in diversion centers.

"We asked the legislature for money for two of them, and before we had completed the first two, we got money for 10, one in each of the state's judicial districts," Fallin said. The ten centers (five of which had opened by the fall of 1989) will make an additional 1,500 beds available, which, in the course of a year, could serve as many as 5,000 offenders. The annual cost per offender is about $12,500, slightly less than the cost of a year in prison.

SHOCK INCARCERATION. An outgrowth of the "scared straight" school of behavior modification, shock incarceration—officially called "special alternative incarceration"—is the most dramatic of all the Georgia alternatives and the most questionable. The program is aimed at men between 17 and 25 years of age who have been convicted of a felony, but who have never been sentenced to an adult prison. Its aim is to shock them with a brief exposure to the "harsh realities of prison life" by putting them for 90 days through a regimen very much like basic military training. The program's boot camps are situated on the grounds of two state prisons, but the offenders assigned to them have no direct contact with prison inmates.

Billie Erwin, the department's evaluator, has watched the program since its inception in 1983. Although not enough time has passed for a full-fledged evaluation, what she sees causes her to worry that the effects of shock incarceration, although dramatic at the outset, are too short-lived to cause long-term avoidance of criminal activity. Because the program is highly photogenic, it has drawn more media coverage than all the other alternatives to incarceration combined and, as a result, more inquiries from would-be emulators. Commissioner David Evans said he is concerned that too many may see the program out of context.

In 1989 there were 250 available beds—enough for 800 shock incarceration probationers each year—in the two prisons that house the program. David Jordan said it is impossible to reckon how many more beds the department would need to satisfy judicial demand for this alternative to full-fledged prison. The program "sure is popular with them," he said. At $3,285 per participant, the program costs roughly one-quarter as much as keeping a person in prison for a year.

TELLING THE STORY

David Jordan, 41, took a few detours before he found his niche in the field of corrections. After working as a salesman, a trucker, a manager, and an assistant information officer for the Georgia House of Representatives, he was doing well as a radio journalist in Atlanta when he heard about a position open in the Department of Corrections' public information office. As a reporter, he had always felt an affinity with the people in law enforcement and corrections whom he sometimes covered. He took the job.

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Public affairs officers often are treated as outsiders by the people with whom they work, a result of the professional/specialist's abiding suspicion of the journalist/generalist. Yet Jordan has come to feel part of his departmental family. He is the *griot*—the resident storyteller, observer, and institutional memory—who is both of the tribe and apart from it. This—and his reflective habit of mind—make Jordan especially valuable to anyone trying to get to the heart of the Georgia story.

Jordan credits Commissioner Evans with creating the environment in which innovation could proceed. First, Jordan says, Evans had the sense not to fight the Guthrie decision, but instead used it to shape the kind of corrections system he and his professionals wanted but had been denied by politics and popular sentiment. Like a jiujitsu fighter, Evans was able to turn an opposing force—in this case, popular and judicial sentiment—to his advantage to achieve change. Second, Evans' style allows his staff to, in Evans' words, "blue-sky" a problem; only then does he subject their suggestions to his own reality test—what the executive branch, the legislature, and the public will approve. Third, Evans' decade in office has helped make his innovations work. "I don't know what effect his tenure has had on the process of innovation," Jordan said, "but I do know that a lot of these things would never have happened if there had been a turnover in commissioners."

At the same time, Jordan credits Vince Fallin and the other probations staff who saw the challenge inherent in the Guthrie decision and met it. Fallin's credibility with the judges, the biggest potential obstacles to any change in the corrections system, enabled him to make proposals that would otherwise have flown in the face of political realities. While Fallin was conferring with the judges, Jordan was out cultivating permission for the innovations from people whose permission was crucial if these programs were to work: legislators, the law-enforcement community, other bureaucrats, and the public. In this way, Fallin and Jordan and their colleagues were able to create programs that have attracted widespread political and judicial support and fused rehabilitation with punishment.

CURES FOR COLORBLINDNESS

CHAPTER

7

Metropolitan Cleveland is one of the most segregated communities in the country. The Cuyahoga River splits the city of Cleveland into a virtually all-white West Side and an East Side that includes—besides the central business district and older industrial areas—many neighborhoods that are almost entirely black.

Descendants of European immigrants attracted to Cleveland's heavy industries in the late 1800s live in predominantly white neighborhoods west of the Cuyahoga. Surrounding suburban areas conform to the same pattern. The population of 37 of 51 suburban communities in Cuyahoga County was at least 95 percent white in 1986. In that same year 11 urban neighborhoods to the east of the river were more than 90 percent black. Some of these were communities in which black families, newly arrived from the South to work in Cleveland's factories, settled during World War II. This segregated pattern was perpetuated in the postwar surge of suburbanization.

By the early 1960s the process known as "white flight" had begun in some eastern suburbs bordering Cleveland. As large numbers of whites moved out, blacks moved in. In that way communities were resegregated. Two of Cleveland's eastern inner-ring suburban communities are 80 percent black today; others are predominantly black in certain census tracts.

This bleak picture of residential segregation by race might appear bleaker were it not for the determination of a group of residents of one eastern Cleveland suburb. Shaker Heights, home to many of the area's decision makers, has for nearly three decades devoted its resources to promoting integration in its housing and schools. Moreover, in cooperation with other communities in the Greater Cleveland area, Shaker Heights has been instrumental in organizing a metropolitan-wide effort to encourage racial diversity in a number of Cleveland's suburbs. Today, this

Children in Shaker Heights grow up in a multiracial environment fostering mutual respect. Housing values remain strong in the area.

network of forces has developed a variety of balanced and comprehensive integration strategies.*

By contrast, the first voluntary effort, inaugurated in Shaker Heights decades ago, concentrated primarily on providing incentives for whites to move into certain Shaker Heights neighborhoods that were attracting growing numbers of blacks. Shaker residents, both white and black, fearing the disinvestment and resegregation that had occurred in other eastern suburbs, supported this approach. But the strategy also drew its critics, and, when the city itself began to operate the program, it gradually undertook to broaden its objectives in order to provide more assistance to black families.

Shaker Heights city officials—in cooperation with officials in other suburbs and with private nonprofit groups—shaped, tested, and adapted their strategies to achieve integration. Objections were voiced and heard. One key discussion about what constituted underrepresentation of a racial group helped refine the notion about when incentives were needed. That the program was modified to arrive at a reasonable balance in serving black as well as white citizens' aims is part of the Shaker Heights achievement, and it is a tribute to the spirit in which the public debate proceeded.

The pro-integration forces first broadened the scope of their effort by involving two other eastern communities—Cleveland Heights, and University Heights. At the same time, the pro-integrationists began to work with the school districts of Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, and University Heights to maintain racial balance in the schools. Eventually the scope widened to include other Cleveland-area communities, both predominantly black or white as well as those in the process of change.

Over the years, city officials and others working with them to promote integration have found that:

- Marketing is the only method that produces results. Shaker Heights, and the East Suburban Council for Open Communities (ESCOC) of which it is a part, concentrate their efforts and money on a package of counseling services and economic incentives aimed at encouraging people to choose homes in neighborhoods where their race is underrepresented.
- Housing integration must be pursued on a metropolitan scale to prevent resegregation of individual communities.
- Pro-integration policies in the schools help support parallel efforts in the housing market.
- Just as people benefit from living in racially diverse and tolerant environments, so do neighborhoods benefit from diversity.

*This chapter draws heavily from "Integration Incentives in Cleveland," a case study written by Howard Husock, case program director of the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Husock's analysis was supervised by Lewis Spence, lecturer at the Kennedy School, and Alan Altshuler.

"INTEGRATION DOES NOT JUST HAPPEN"

Don DeMarco, who came to Shaker Heights to direct its Community Services Department in 1982, gave a speech in April 1989 to Cleveland city officials in which he articulated the race-conscious, pro-integration approach that has guided him in his years of public service. Among his observations:

Integration does not just happen. It takes race-conscious, pro-integrative effort to effect and maintain. Colorblind or race-neutral approaches simply do not work. They almost always result in resegregation—or what I term "American apartheid"....

We fervently want to have integration happen and be maintained "naturally." But as Kenneth Clark, the famed sociologist and expert witness on the Brown *v.* Board of Education *case, has told us: "To be colorblind in a racist society is to be a racist."*

Developed at the turn of the century for a wide range of income groups, Shaker Heights' patterns of land use encourage population diversity. Its neighborhoods include some districts in which half-million dollar mansions are not uncommon and others in which the homes are relatively modest—"starter homes" in the parlance of today's real estate industry. This more modest kind of housing tends to be clustered near the Cleveland city line. Families can, in theory, move up the real estate ladder to the top of the Cleveland-area market without ever leaving this suburban city of 30,000.

Until well after World War II, developers enforced restrictive covenants in Shaker Heights. Supported by the real estate industry and upheld by some state courts, these covenants excluded Jews, Catholics, and blacks. Even though restrictive covenants were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1948, exclusionary practices continued for years afterward, sanctioned by the Federal Housing Administration.

It was not until the second half of the 1950s that blacks were able to buy houses in Shaker Heights. The first black buyers were attracted to the relatively modest neighborhoods in the area known as South Shaker. This was an upscale move from the Cleveland neighborhoods in which they had been living.

AN ABSENCE OF PANIC

Among the first black buyers in the South Shaker neighborhood of Ludlow was a dentist named Winston Richie who had been raised in a predominantly white neighborhood in Cleveland. Richie moved to Shaker Heights in 1956 when his children reached school age. He wanted his children, he said, to learn that they could successfully compete with whites in school so that they could go on to compete effectively in college and in the business world.

Early in the 1960s the increasing numbers of blacks moving into a Cleveland neighborhood on Shaker Heights' border prompted Richie and some of his neighbors to consider ways of intervening to prevent their community from becoming resegregated. A series of articles in the now-defunct *Cleveland Press* had inadvertently encouraged the transition. "In less than two years that neighborhood changed from 90 percent white to 90 percent black just on the strength of headlines. They thought they were just reporting the story, but they played into the hands of the block-busters," said Stephen J. Alfred, a white resident of Shaker Heights' Lomond neighborhood and one of the early activists.

The neighborhood associations in South Shaker were aware that black families were moving into their community. Yet there was little of the panic that had triggered white flight in other neighborhoods. Residents met in small groups to discuss how to accommodate the changes. "We took the position that people have a right to live anywhere they can afford to live. If they wanted to buy in Shaker, which seemed likely, we wanted that to be a peaceful process," said Alfred, who later, as mayor of Shaker Heights, would help develop the city's municipal plans to promote integration.

SETTING FIRST PRIORITIES

With blacks attracted to good public schools and sound, affordable housing in border communities such as Ludlow, and with whites moving out, the neighborhood association leadership felt that its first priority had to be to stimulate white demand. Richie and Alfred found both black and white leaders in accord on this objective, and the Shaker Heights citizenry agreed. A 1982 survey found that blacks in Shaker Heights supported the program even more strongly than whites.

"Blacks who came here," said Alfred, "had moved from places where there was very little time between when the first black moved in and the last white moved out. They equated this with a lower level of public services, particularly public education. They were moving to the suburbs to better their life styles and to provide greater opportunities for their children, just like white families; exactly the same motivation."

Yet few blacks were willing to speak openly in favor of offering incentives to whites to stay or to move to neighborhoods where whites were underrepresented. Alfred and Richie understood the reticence of some of their black allies who recognized that blacks outside Shaker Heights would likely view the policy as exclusionary.

"There was, and continues to be, tension between black families who have made it and those who have not," Alfred said. "This is why they don't feel comfortable about talking about it publicly. It's the age-old tension between the haves and have-nots."

The Shaker Heights neighborhood associations used their modest financial resources to attract white families willing to move into three South Shaker neighborhoods, and later those groups provided small, below-market loans to help whites purchase houses there. The private, nonprofit Shaker Communities Development Foundation actually bought houses in the rapidly changing Moreland neighborhood in hopes of selling them to white families. The effort did not succeed in maintaining racial balance. Moreland is now predominantly black and is still a working-class community.

A NEW MUNICIPAL AGENCY

In the mid-1960s it became clear that a group of volunteers could no longer sustain the level of effort needed to prevent their neighborhoods from becoming resegregated. In 1967 the group asked the school board and City Council to form a new municipal agency, primarily to recruit white buyers for changing neighborhoods.

Creation of a city agency would make these activities official functions, not just private manifestations of civic concern. The proposal triggered much of the same kind of soul-searching that preceded the formation of the voluntary coalition. Was it right, in the interest of promoting and maintaining racial diversity, to show housing to whites and not to blacks in neighborhoods threatened by resegregation?

Tom Webb, then a Shaker Heights city councilman, described the council's approach, "It was our premise that this was not a black issue but a white issue. We were not trying to keep blacks out. The problem was not blacks moving in but whites moving out."

The city and schools established a Housing Office with a budget that reached $200,000 in 1982 and more than $500,000 in 1990. Funds on that scale were needed, proponents argued, to counteract what was widely viewed as a tendency by real estate brokers to practice "racial steering"—showing homes in some neighborhoods only to blacks and homes in others only to whites. Real estate brokers operating in Shaker Heights denied that they were engaged in such practices.

The Housing Office competed for real estate listings in racially changing neighborhoods, and it particularly sought out white families to whom it could show the houses in those neighborhoods. Perhaps because it operated on the assumption that few black families could afford homes in North Shaker, where prices then often exceeded $250,000, the agency seldom looked for opportunities to perform the same service for blacks who might be inclined to move to predominantly white neighborhoods. The given rationale was that blacks were underrepresented neither in Shaker Heights as a whole nor in its school system.

The Housing Office became the target of dissatisfaction among some Cleveland blacks, especially those who wanted to move to changing neighborhoods in Shaker Heights. Winston Richie remembers the typical reaction: "What kind of place is this? They have enough blacks; they're trying to keep us out; they've reached their quota."

One of the most persistent critics of Shaker Heights' housing policies has been real estate broker Richard Harvey, former chairman of both the Cleveland Association of Real Estate Brokers and the area chapter of the National Organization of Black Real Estate Brokers. His views of the pro-integrationist program are unequivocal:

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This program is offensive to African Americans. Integration maintenance is to maintain the status quo that existed in Shaker Heights. . . . When minority population reaches 30 percent African American, it ignites unfounded fear, which means they [the city] have to put in place programs that maintain that ratio. They call that integration maintenance.

To the distress of many Shaker Heights residents, two black and three white Housing Office staff members quit in protest in 1978, charging that the agency pursued a policy that deemphasized service for blacks in designated neighborhoods. Specifically, they declared, though black buyers with the means to move into North Shaker could get some loans through the Moreland Community Association and the Shaker Communities Development Foundation, black families were given too little assistance overall.

The walkout caused some Shaker residents to refocus their attention on the segregation still in their midst. Census data showed that 69 percent of the blacks in Shaker Heights lived in two census tracts that were more than 40 percent black; 68 percent of the whites lived in four tracts that were at least 90 percent white. Some people suggested that racial disparities among Shaker Heights neighborhoods would have been even more pronounced had not large numbers of Cleveland black families begun, in the 1970s, to move to adjoining Cleveland Heights, also on Cleveland's border, where modestly priced homes were more plentiful.

CLEVELAND HEIGHTS

The first black families who moved to Cleveland Heights were greeted by a series of troubling incidents, including a firebombing, so the City Council acted quickly to avert further incidents. It sent an open letter to all residents, stating the city's commitment to diversity and welcoming newcomers of all races and religions. It also attempted to ease tensions by creating a new position, Commissioner of Community and Public

Mothers outside Woodbury Middle School. For decades Shaker Heights has promoted integration in its housing and its schools.

Relations, and inaugurating a community relations network—still at work today—to ease racial and religious disharmony.

The policy on religious diversity was important because Cleveland Heights has one of the largest Jewish communities in the Midwest. The Jewish Community Federation later provided financial support for young Jewish families willing to remain in established Jewish neighborhoods that were undergoing change. In this way, they could stay close to the synagogues and the kosher markets that were at the heart of their communities.

In 1972, in association with the Jewish Community Federation and the Catholic Commission on Community Action, the city encouraged formation of the Heights Community Congress. Two years later it established the Heights Housing Service to show black and white prospects available property anywhere in the city. These measures followed publication in 1972 of an audit by the Social Justice Committee of St. Ann's Catholic church revealing that real estate firms were showing black prospects homes only in Cleveland Heights and failing to show potential white buyers homes there. Five years later the Community Congress joined with the city in a suit charging an area real estate firm with racial steering; they won a favorable judgment in federal court in 1983.

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CHANGES AFOOT

The Cleveland Heights experience drove home to Shaker Heights officials the value of adopting pro-integration approaches that extended outside the city to include other jurisdictions. Significant changes were afoot in the entire pro-integration movement.

The city was looking for a new director for the Housing Office. Shaker officials conducted a national search for a professional with a reputation for achievement in the field of integration. Donald DeMarco, who is white, came to Shaker Heights in 1982 with extensive experience in supporting integration in the Chicago suburbs and in two other Midwestern cities. He was hired to direct the programs of the Housing Office, newly reorganized as the Community Services Department.

Strategy as well as policy changed as DeMarco assumed direction of the Shaker Heights program. As DeMarco provided the vision for change, Alfred, who became Shaker Heights' mayor in January 1984, provided the will and the political persistence necessary to achieve it. They recognized that they had to alter the program if it was not to be perceived as helping whites only. They had to find more visible ways to help blacks find housing. They recognized, too, that they could no longer focus narrowly on Shaker Heights. They had to open markets in other parts of the region.

THE EAST SUBURBAN COUNCIL FOR OPEN COMMUNITIES

One of DeMarco's earliest actions was to establish ties with other eastern suburbs; the resulting network of jurisdictions coordinated their efforts to promote racial diversity. The alliance, called the East Suburban Council for Open Communities (ESCOC), consists of the cities of Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, and University Heights, and two school districts—the Shaker Heights School District and the Cleveland Heights/University Heights School District. ESCOC is supported in significant part by contributions from these jurisdictions.

The pro-integration coalition turned its attention to a group of communities known collectively as Hillcrest. Hillcrest included overwhelmingly white South Euclid, Lyndhurst, Mayfield Heights, Richmond Heights, Highland Heights, and Mayfield Village. Homes in these communities were newer and relatively less expensive than those in the more affluent areas of Shaker Heights. But none of them had a counterpart to Winston Richie or Stephen Alfred. In fact, many of the residents of these communities had moved there to escape racially changing neighborhoods in Cleveland. They were reluctant to encourage even a limited growth in the number of blacks moving to their neighborhoods, much less to fund incentives for such moves.

ESCOC's housing service, directed by Winston Richie, who had been a Shaker Heights councilman, opened an office in 1985 in Lyndhurst in the center of Hillcrest. By 1988 ESCOC's housing service had found housing there for 79 black home buyers and 95 black renters. A Cleveland Foundation grant to ESCOC was used to provide pro-integration loans for 12 of these buyers. Hillcrest still declines to participate formally in ESCOC.

THE FUND FOR THE FUTURE OF SHAKER HEIGHTS AND THE HEIGHTS FUND

In addition to founding the East Suburban Council for Open Communities, Shaker Heights and Cleveland Heights concentrated on increasing financial incentives for pro-integration moves within their borders. In 1985 Shaker sought and received funding from the Cleveland Foundation and the George Gund Foundation ($100,000, to be matched by contributions from local donors) to establish an incentive fund for home buyers making pro-integration moves into targeted areas of the city. The idea was to incorporate a number of smaller, neighborhood loan funds found throughout Shaker Heights and to consolidate them into a new entity, the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights.* The fund offers revolving loans, about 20 each year, to black and white buyers. These

*These neighborhood loan funds included the Lomond Association, the Ludlow Company, the Shaker Communities Development Foundation, and the Moreland Community Association. The last two groups had made loans primarily to blacks buying in North Shaker.

loans, written as second mortgages, may be in the form of down-payment or monthly mortgage assistance; they have a deferred pay-back and a fixed interest rate of 6 percent.

Cleveland Heights replicated the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights in 1986 when it formed the Heights Fund. Initially supported by the same local foundations with a local donor match, the Heights Fund guidelines are similar to those of its Shaker Heights counterpart.

LOOKING TO STATE GOVERNMENT

In 1982 Ohio voters approved a referendum establishing the Ohio Housing Finance Agency (OHFA). OHFA floated tax-exempt bonds to create a pool of funds to lend, through participating banks, at below-market rates to qualified first-time buyers. Nothing in the agency's charter spelled out a fair housing mission. Nevertheless, DeMarco and other fair housing advocates, primarily from Shaker Heights and Cleveland Heights, launched an effort to get OHFA's board to set aside 10 percent of its anticipated $100 million in bond proceeds for pro-integration housing. Other fair housing groups in the region, notably the Metropolitan Strategies Group, coordinated the effort.

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At first, OHFA's nine-member board rejected, as outside its mandate, the integration incentive set-aside. But in 1985 the death of a 67-year-old black grandmother in a firebombing in a west side Cleveland neighborhood was cited by fair housing advocates and black elected officials of Cleveland and suburban cities as proof of the need for increased government action. The following month the board, reportedly under pressure from Governor Richard Celeste, voted to allocate $7 million on a trial basis for integration mortgage incentives assistance. The board directed that the earmarked money be distributed to potential buyers moving into areas where they were "racially underrepresented."

Regulations proposed by the Metropolitan Strategies Group at the request of OHFA took the unprecedented step of defining racial underrepresentation. Under the 10/40 plan, a neighborhood would have to be at least 90 percent white for blacks to qualify for pro-integration loans and at least 40 percent black for whites to qualify for such loans; the thresholds were set by taking the percentage of the county population that was then black, 25 percent, and adding or subtracting 15 percent.

The set-aside program was in force for two months in 1985, during which time 30 black and 19 white borrowers qualified for $3 million in mortgages. After September 1985, the program's 9.8 percent interest rate could not compete with falling conventional lending rates, and consumer demand for the loans temporarily dried up. Nevertheless, the funds were credited with helping open two communities in the eastern suburbs.

All Shaker Heights public schools are balanced racially. Thanks to community support, the system boasts a strong academic record.

In 1986 the legislator representing all-white Parma in Cleveland's western suburbs threatened to block a gubernatorial appointment to the OHFA board unless the agency suspended integration assistance pending a ruling by the Ohio attorney general. The OHFA loan program was frozen while Attorney General Anthony Celebrezze, Jr., deliberated.

In 1987 Celebrezze issued an opinion upholding the legality of integration assistance. But within a month more complications arose. At an OHFA board meeting in January 1988, opposition to the 10/40 plan surfaced, not from white realtors and white suburban officials, but from a black board member, a Celeste appointee from Shaker Heights. Reducing the cost of borrowing for whites, said the dissident board member, would have the effect of denying blacks opportunities to buy. Despite his opposition, the board voted to renew integration assistance, but they left open the question of what percentages constituted underrepresentation of a racial group.

A MINORITY SET-ASIDE

A period of public debate followed, during which Richard Harvey on behalf of the Cleveland Association of Real Estate Brokers, the black trade group, mounted a campaign urging OHFA to set aside 25 percent of the mortgage assistance to help blacks move anywhere they chose. "It's not wrong if a neighborhood becomes all Jewish," said Richard Harvey, "or if it is all Italian or all Polish. Why must it be a threat if it becomes all black?"

Winston Richie responded, "When people ask what's wrong with an all-black community, I ask them to explain what's right about an all-white community. We're not proposing quotas. No one is hindered in his or her efforts to buy anywhere he chooses. We just market to the race that is underrepresented."

In June 1988 the OHFA board adopted a policy statement on fair housing and integrated communities. The statement said OHFA "may respond to local preferences for. . .the purpose of encouraging residential integration, provided these activities are not coercive but voluntary and persuasive, and that they expand rather than restrict housing choice for minorities."

Finally, the board resolved the dispute with a compromise. It set aside nearly $11 million for prospective buyers willing to move to areas where their population group was underrepresented and allocated an equal amount to minority buyers to help them move anywhere they chose.

Although OHFA mortgage assistance helps foster balanced racial distribution in Cleveland suburbs with modestly priced housing, its $73,260 cap on the price of the eligible housing severely limits the program's use in communities such as Shaker Heights where the median house price is higher.

COOPERATION WITH REAL ESTATE FIRMS

Over the years the pro-integration forces and the major real estate firms in Shaker, Cleveland, and University Heights have generally established a cooperative relationship. The area's largest firm, Realty 1, instructs all its sales people to contact the Shaker Heights Community Services Department and the ESCOC offices when they show a black client a house. For their part, the staff members in all offices—Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, and ESCOC—are careful to see that real estate agents get commissions on any sales that ESCOC, through its pro-integration marketing, encourages.

In 1988 a new joint program was established, overseen by a council composed of representatives from the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights, the Heights Fund, and each participating ESCOC jurisdiction. The joint program, administered through the Shaker Heights Community Services Department, creates new incentives for real estate agents to engage in pro-integration marketing. Three firms (two large predominantly white firms and one smaller black firm) have signed agreements with the program: the firms' agents receive a bonus equal to one-half of one percent of the selling price when they sell houses to buyers whose population group is underrepresented in designated neighborhoods of Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, University Heights, and Hillcrest. Half of the bonus (one-quarter of one percent) is provided by the incentive program. The other half of the bonus comes from the real estate firms themselves.

OPEN DOOR WEST

During the three decades in which the eastern suburbs sought to cope with blockbusting, white flight, and racial steering, most residents of the predominantly white western suburbs have remained unperturbed by their own segregated residential situation. Ironically, the first of these communities to consider accepting the counsel of Shaker Heights fair housing advocates was Parma, the city whose state senator sought to block the Ohio Housing Finance Agency's pro-integration set-aside.

Parma, periodically deprived of federal assistance in past years for failing to meet the Department of Housing and Urban Development's anti-discrimination guidelines, is now under a federal court order to end what the court found to be discrimination in its residential patterns. The joint program has offered Parma a shared-cost agreement under which representatives from the pro-integration agencies in Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, and the Hillcrest area assist Parma in developing a city-run housing service to attract black buyers and renters to the city and to assist in the formation of financial incentive programs to encourage pro-integration moves.

In May 1990 the City of Parma announced its commitment to work

with the East Suburban Council for Open Communities to organize and fund a city-operated program to attract black homeowners using pro-integration services and financial incentives. Preliminary organizational work has begun.

Meanwhile, a fair housing group called Open Door West is seeking to lower racial barriers in other western suburbs with the support of foundations and such organizations as the League of Women Voters. So far Open Door West, a biracial, nonprofit group, has no municipal support. But the fact that it was formed has encouraged pro-integration leaders in the eastern suburbs.

MARKET RESPONSE

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Back in Shaker Heights the conventional real estate market is beginning to respond positively to pro-integration incentives, Don DeMarco observes. The results of a multiracial market, he contends, are becoming apparent: "Shaker Heights is the only inner-ring suburb where housing values have beaten inflation since 1967. Shaker's appreciation is greater than twice the county suburban average."

DeMarco argues that it is essential that buyers understand racial trends in neighborhoods when they are shopping for homes. They may buy in what appears to be an integrated neighborhood only to discover that they are contributing to the disappearance of the integration they prize.

Information dissemination is an important function of the Shaker Community Services Department. Prospective buyers are told of the availability of financial assistance from the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights and other sources. They are escorted to available homes for sale or rent. Public officials—the chief of police, the superintendent of schools, the mayor—have volunteered to talk to prospective buyers. "We think we are most effective person-to-person rather than through publications or other media," said Winston Richie. "We and our affiliate offices spend hours talking to prospects."

THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOLS

Shaker Heights' civic and government leaders understood early that if they were to achieve an integrated community that ideal must be pursued in the schools as well as in the neighborhoods. In 1986, citing a desire to balance schools racially as a primary goal, the school board redistricted attendance areas. It closed four of nine elementary schools and created district-wide schools above grade five. The remaining five elementary schools are balanced racially. The middle and high schools, organized with separate schools for grades five and six, grades seven and eight, and grades nine through twelve, reflect the racial make-up of the district.

For parents of both races this stability has a reassuring effect, Don DeMarco said, since families often consider the educational and social welfare of their children when contemplating a pro-integration move. For example, a black family considering living in a neighborhood in which blacks are underrepresented—there are three such neighborhoods—can be assured that the children will attend a school in which black children are not underrepresented. The same is true for whites in the three neighborhoods where they are underrepresented; three other neighborhoods are well balanced racially.

The Shaker schools have a record of excellence that continues to attract families who might otherwise send their children to private schools. When enrollment declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the school board transferred the money saved by closing some schools into enrichment programs for the others. Eighty-five percent of graduates go on to four-year colleges, and Shaker consistently ranks high in the number of its Merit Scholarship semi-finalists.

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

What lessons emerge from 30 years of experience in promoting integration in Cleveland's eastern suburbs? Don DeMarco offers one caveat: "Unlike the panty-hose claim, one size does not fit all. Shaker's operational programs cannot be replicated in toto by most other jurisdictions."

DeMarco also urges fair housing advocates to focus single-mindedly on their primary goal and not be distracted by related and important issues such as homelessness, hunger, or poor families' need for such services as weatherization assistance. Like DeMarco, Mayor Stephen Alfred prefaces a discussion of the export potential of the Heights experience with a qualifier: "It is not for everybody." But he quickly adds:

It is my belief that in every major urban area in this country, there are people in close-in suburbs of reasonable affluence and education who are disposed to follow this path. This does not mean the majority of suburbs will do it. But they can do it. They should do it. Most of all, we believe it is right. People should be able to live where they can afford to live. Race ought not to be the predominant factor in where blacks and whites feel free to live.

WASTE-WATER WARS*

CHAPTER

8

The North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board of California was following a mandate of the federal Clean Water Act amendments of 1972 when it directed five communities surrounding Humboldt Bay to start planning for a regional sewage treatment plant. That federal legislation calls for area-wide solutions to water quality problems, which many environmentalists see as key to coordinating land use on a regional scale. Perhaps no state has matched federal efforts on water quality with more enthusiasm than California.

After a study of the Humboldt Bay basin, one of 16 in the state, California state water pollution officials concluded that the area's waste-water treatment needs could best be addressed by a regional facility that would treat sewage from towns ringing the bay and discharge the treated water into the ocean beyond the bay. This plan was in keeping with both the Clean Water Act and California law, which also stresses regional approaches to water quality control; furthermore, it conformed to state-of-the-art engineering practices.

One town chose to buck all this conventional wisdom. Arcata, with a population of 12,849, wanted to develop an independent treatment system. Collaboration between the town's city council and scientists at Humboldt State University had yielded a decidedly unorthodox proposal. Arcata wanted to upgrade its aging but serviceable treatment plant and add to it a series of oxidation ponds in which salmon would be raised and marshes that would clean the waste water and provide a habitat for wildlife. This system would then discharge the treated water—and the salmon—into the bay. Not only would Arcata's system be cheaper than the proposed regional facility, the town argued, but it would also enhance the quality of Humboldt Bay. Moreover, the wetlands it created could become a major recreation area.

*This title and much of the material in this chapter are taken from a Kennedy School case study written by Esther Scott and Leslie Brunetta at the direction of Alan Altshuler and Marc Zegans.

The 170-acre Arcata Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary, which has attracted birds in profusion, adds positively to the bay's ecosystem.

In fact, what Arcata wanted became clear only years later; at the outset its objectives were vague. When it was more or less ordered to participate in the regional treatment system, representatives of the town knew only that they did not want to participate. For one thing, they feared that the city's share of the cost of operation and upkeep of a regional system would be too high in both monetary and political terms. It took five years of thinking, talking, reading, meeting, and researching—in addition to playing some political hard ball—to come up with what has become known as the Arcata plan. During that period of deliberation, the city government of Arcata, lacking a clear picture of what it wanted and, therefore, a strategy for achieving it, took steps to avoid what it did not want. These tactics were seen by its adversaries as delaying and foot dragging. The town's chief antagonist, North Coast Regional Board chief executive David Joseph, later called it "petty local nationalism."

A CLASH OF CULTURES

How Arcata determined for itself what it should do and how it resisted doing what superior levels of government—and neighboring municipalities—demanded that it do is as much a story of changing relationships among levels of American government as it is a story of scientific innovation. It is also a story about the clash of top-down and bottom-up cultures, a struggle that continues in different arenas of government and society today.

The top-down culture began, in this case, with the federal and state environmental establishments, which tended to define problems in national terms. Nationwide research conducted to undergird national policy often obscured local differences by submerging their statistics into national averages. Policies to address these national problems were then designed by the same people responsible for defining them: Congressional representatives and their staff, bureaucrats in the agencies involved—in this case the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—and state and local government lobbies. The federal government provided the bulk of the money for effecting these solutions, and required state and local governments to pay a percentage of the costs. The states, and sometimes the counties, were expected to act as the federal government's field agents in carrying out its policies. This culture lived on federal money and federal regulations.

The bottom-up culture, in this case, had as its central tenets citizen participation, decentralized management, appropriate scale and technology, and respect for nature and history. Its proponents were held together by a shared distrust of the established order, including its scholarship. They claimed they wanted to create a compassionate, nonexploitative society built on a human, as opposed to an institutional, scale and

founded on consensus. They were influenced by such books as the Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth*, published in 1972; E. F. Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful*, published in 1973; and such articles as "A Time to Choose," Amory Lovens' argument for "soft energy paths," printed in a 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine.

For all its unconventionality, the bottom-up culture came to political power in Arcata in a time-honored way and over a classic issue in California politics, a dispute over a proposed freeway. Spurred by public concern that from time to time people were killed trying to cross U.S. Route 101, the Arcata City Council had agreed with the California Department of Transportation's plans to turn the highway into a freeway. The council had paid little attention to the details of the plan before it was released to the public in 1971.

Alexandra Fairless Stillman, who had moved to Arcata from San Francisco only two years before, looked at the plan and saw devastation. As Franklin Klopp, Arcata's public works director, put it succinctly years later, the state had "redesigned Route 101 to overkill standards." Its plan would have required destruction of the old city hall and other historically important buildings, elimination of beautiful landscaping, and loss of housing for students at Humboldt State University. In short, the freeway would have obliterated substantial chunks of the city's history.

Stillman announced her candidacy in the 1972 election for City Council on a platform of preserving Arcata's history and opposing the freeway. "I don't think the oldtimers thought I had a chance," Stillman recalled in August 1989. "But that was the year that the 18-year-olds got the vote, and there was a lot doing in women's issues." She got help from faculty members and students at the university. "I spent $65 and won," she laughed. In doing so, she became the first female member of the Arcata City Council and would go on to become the city's first female mayor.

Stillman's election marked the beginning of a shift in council membership. Two years later, Stillman was joined on the council by Wesley Chesbro and Dan Hauser; two years after that, by Sam Pennisi. "We used the term progressive to describe ourselves," Pennisi said, "because we share a liberal outlook on government and we are fiscal conservatives." It was this conservatism that was to put the young council members at odds with the regional waste-water treatment plan, the national government, and economic forces in surrounding communities.

A NEW STYLE OF POLITICS

Stillman's election and the widening progressive majority on the council also marked the beginning of a new decision-making process and style in Arcata politics in which the new majority saw itself as being instructed by the citizenry as well as instructing it.

The newcomers' highly consultative, participatory style was well received in the university town in which environmental issues—for example, the sources of air and water pollution, the impact of nuclear energy, and the preservation of the redwoods—were important topics of discussion. "Arcatans feel that there is still hope for the environment as long as we keep talking about it," Assistant City Engineer Stephen Leiker said.

Talk they do, and organize as well. "We have the North Coast Environmental Center, Citizens Against Toxic Substances, Humboldt Herbicide Task Force, the Redwood Alliance, and the Citizens for Social Responsibility, to name a few," Leiker said. "Those are groups of people who are interested and involved." But, he adds, "they are not the Earth First types. They talk about strategies. They compare what is happening in other places. They are interested in ripples, not in tidal waves."

Council member Sam Pennisi offered this appraisal:

We work out of a firm sense of self-identity here in Arcata and self-confidence. From the outside looking in, I imagine it looks like misplaced righteousness. I liken it to all this new talk about personal self-esteem. I think that is what Arcata has. I don't think Arcatans would say that they are right, but that they think their ideas are worthy and that they are competent explorers. . . . We [on the council] discuss these things in open forum; we talk about the likely consequences, how other people will view it, what waves it will make. We are representative of our community.

It is fair to say that Arcatans trust this government, look to it for leadership, support it. But I have one caveat. There is a two-way street here. The people who want to be involved consider themselves to be leaders as well. They look at us as leaders and to us as listeners. They feel a strong communications link with us as well. They don't look to us for all the ideas. When they perceive that we are relying too much on staff and not listening to the "people" they let us know.

What happened to the freeway well conveys the Arcata City Council's approach. The freeway was not stopped; rather its scale was reduced, and it was built. It cuts the university off physically from downtown Arcata like a great wall, but the safety problem has been addressed, housing has been saved, the historical fabric of the town has been preserved, and, on balance, people are reasonably well pleased.

PROPOSAL, COUNTERPROPOSAL

Humboldt Bay is a critical body of water in northern California. The largest estuary between San Francisco Bay and the Columbia River in Oregon, it accounts for about two-thirds of the state's harvest of Pacific oysters. In the 1970s Eureka (population 24,000), the largest town on Humboldt Bay, had an antiquated sewage system; so did McKinleyville, a fast-growing,

unincorporated area, unlisted in the 1970 Census but with a population of more than 7,000 a decade later. Arcata's sewage system, though more modern, had failed on occasion. All told, the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board estimated, Arcata, Eureka, and McKinleyville dumped about 3.5 million gallons of inadequately treated waste water into Humboldt Bay daily.

Two major engineering studies, one by a private firm and one by the state Water Resources Control Board, recommended a regional system in which towns along the bay would pipe raw sewage under the bay to a consolidated plant that would discharge its effluent into the ocean beyond. The board moved to enforce compliance with this plan, although a later report from its consultants estimated that it would cost up to 15 percent more than a system that would discharge into the bay.

Meantime, Arcata had joined with Eureka to commission a study that would help these two communities meet the tougher requirements of the 1972 federal Clean Water amendments. The engineering firm they hired recommended a bay-discharge system that would cost $16 million, 87.5 percent of which would be paid by the federal and state governments. By contrast, the estimated capital cost of the regional, ocean-discharge plan was $21 million in 1975.

The state Water Resources Control Board, under pressure from the federal Environmental Protection Agency, rejected the Arcata-Eureka proposal, insisting on the costlier regional plant. Yet the Arcata City Council, ignoring its city manager's advice, decided to prepare a counter-proposal. Talking, consulting, and weighing consequences were about to begin in earnest. Although the council had a clear idea of what it did not want, its notion of what it did want was only just taking shape, based in part on the findings of George Allen.

As early as the 1960s Allen, a fisheries expert on the faculty at Humboldt State, had raised salmon in small ponds in a mixture of waste water and sea water. By 1974 Dr. Robert Gearheart, a professor of environmental resources engineering, also at Humboldt State, was telling the city about scientific evidence that both plant and animal life in wetlands areas helped to "polish" effluent. Wetlands treatment systems, he believed, could make waste water environmentally safe for discharge into bays and estuaries.

In September 1974 Arcata applied to the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board for permission to let the city set up its own "low-tech" alternative system that would combine waste-water treatment with salmon ranching. The city needed a variance from the policy that prohibited direct discharge of effluent in the bay. The regional board denied it, insisting on compliance with state and federal policies promoting area-wide solutions.

Franklin Klopp, Arcata's Director of Public Works, is an athletic, compact man with gray hair and the perpetual tan of an outdoors person. Whatever problem he may have initially had with the low-tech approach to the city's sewage treatment dilemma, he also wanted to avoid the crushing costs of the regional system and the resulting political fallout. Klopp said:

We had two studies done by engineering consultants. I was leafing through them one day, not paying close attention. On the last two pages of one of them, there were figures that showed us running out of money just as the regional plan was completed. We had just doubled our sewer rates. I had taken a hell of a beating from rate payers. We would have to double them again for the regional system. I walked into the city manager's office and Sam Pennisi and Mayor Hauser were there. I said maybe we ought to try to get out of this one more time. They said, "Okay."

Klopp's greatest difficulty with the alternative plan was technical and imaginative: he could not quite envision how the idea was going to translate into reality.

Sam Pennisi recalls that Frank Klopp came to understand how the system might actually work in 1978 on a visit to Mountain View, California. Pennisi taught an environmental course* at Humboldt State with Gearheart, the sanitary engineer who was advising the city on the waste-water treatment plan. "I think Gearheart had a good vision of what needed to be done, but up to that point, he had not been able to impart that vision, especially to Frank [Klopp]," Pennisi said. "Frank needed to see something."

The Mountain View sewer district in the San Francisco Bay Area was the site of an experiment using organisms to give tertiary treatment to sewage effluent, thus rendering it harmless enough to be safely discharged into the marine ecology. Klopp recalled:

That was a breakthrough. That was the first time we got the marsh concept. Before this it was just using the ponds for fisheries. Now we could use them to finish off the effluent and make it dischargeable. Up to then, we were looking, groping for an alternative. That's when the brainstorming started.

The city proposed to upgrade its existing plant to meet EPA's new discharge standards. Then the water from its sewage ponds would be channeled through a marsh the city would build. Cattails, bulrushes, and other plants and algae in the marsh would further cleanse the water, bringing it to the level of tertiary treatment. Some of the waste water would be used for raising salmon and trout. Releasing the fish and the treated waste water—clean water—into the bay could be thought to enhance it

*Ironically, it was a course on how to write an environmental impact statement, a good way of teaching resource majors the basics of federal environmental law.

within the terms of the law. And that achievement, Arcata's planners reasoned, would exempt their town from a state policy to phase out the discharge of municipal waters to most of the state's bays and estuaries.

THE DEBATE INTENSIFIES

Al[illegible]andra Stillman had wondered from the outset why the regional sewer treatment plant had to be so big, and she and her colleagues on the council had wanted to look at alternatives. Council members had other concerns, however. "There were so many other things happening at the time," Stillman recalled in August 1989. "Criminal justice planning, a new bus system. So we had to divvy up the responsibilities among the council."

Stillman drew the sewage treatment responsibility. The Humboldt Bay Water Authority (HBWA), formed in January 1975, was overseeing plans for the regional system. But by the fall of 1976 inflation had driven estimates of construction costs to $52 million. In addition, knowledgeable citizens in Arcata were projecting that the system's operating costs would be prohibitive, in part because of the energy it would consume, in part because of its potential for negative environmental impact. They feared, among other hazards, accidental rupture of the underwater collector lines.

These projections put new pressure on the City Council to name a Marsh Task Force charged with revising its earlier plan for an independent treatment system. The task force marshaled the evidence in favor of the Arcata plan, including a ruling by a regional board in the San Francisco area that marsh treatment could meet water-enhancement requirements and a state policy, adopted in 1977, encouraging projects employing "used" water to create natural habitats.

But the council was subject to another, countervailing pressure. David Joseph, Executive Director of the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board, and his staff, hoping to stop Arcata's dawdling about the regional system, had imposed a construction moratorium on Eureka and Arcata until their sewage treatment capacity was increased. Eureka, much more growth-conscious than Arcata, would not feel the pinch as soon as its smaller neighbor to the north—it still had some limited sewage treatment capacity available. Arcata, on the other hand, had none, and although promoting growth was not uppermost in Arcatans' minds, a prolonged period during which new building was prohibited would put political pressure on the council to get on with the regional plan.

ESCALATION

Even so, Assistant City Engineer Stephen Leiker, who is from San Jose, and a number of his friends and teachers from Humboldt State saw the dispute over the "giant water treatment scheme" as a growth issue and a home rule issue as well as a technological issue. "We learned [in San Jose]

that as long as you had the water and the sewer, there was no limit to growth," he said. They became involved in Citizens for a Sewer Referendum, a large, loose-knit group that wanted to provide "another front or forum for asking questions and making noise about the proposal." They found a sympathetic response. Arcatans had been effective enough at resisting pell-mell growth to have preserved from development the short stretch of Route 101 that separates Arcata from Eureka—a lovely vista of sky, bay, and grasslands.

Meanwhile, delays kept pushing cost estimates of the regional plan higher. Opposition stiffened in the business community after revelation of what purported to be HBWA's schedule of business assessments; increases of up to 600 percent were slated. At the same time, a citizen group, which had been thwarted in an effort to force a referendum on issuing bonds for the regional plan, took that question to court.

Arcata's Marsh Task Force presented the City Council with a revised independent treatment system. Features added to the original 1974 plan included provisions for community access to the bay shore, creation of parkland, a facility to provide educational opportunities for residents of all ages, and reclamation of an earth mound that remained after capping of a landfill, which the plan dubbed Mount Trashmore.* The council approved the new scheme and took it to the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board in March 1977 in another appeal for approval. In late May the board surprised Arcata by immediately scheduling a public hearing on the proposal.

City engineers and other staff employees crammed months of work into a week in order to have Arcata's presentation ready for the June hearing. Though supported by an alliance of taxpayer advocates and environmental representatives, the city failed to prevail against the board's legal and engineering staff. The board offered evidence, bolstered by testimony of a fish and game biologist, that Arcata's plan might endanger the bay's oyster beds.

With the fight escalating, the council continued to gather support for its position. In a referendum, 76 percent of Arcatans voting chose the independent sewer system over the regional plan. When the issue went before the state Water Resources Control Board in September 1977, Arcata was supported by national representatives of the Audubon Society and the Sierra Club and waste-water experts from Utah State University and the University of California at Berkeley. With construction moratoria stalling development in Humboldt Bay cities and with lawsuits languishing in the courts, the region anxiously awaited the state board's ruling. A month later the state sustained the regional board's plan for a regional system.

*Arcatans' playfulness in their choice of names extends to the four principal ponds in the marsh: Klopp Lake, Gearheart Marsh, Allen Marsh, and Harris Marsh, the latter named after the Humboldt State ornithologist, also known as the "bird man," who was a consultant on the project.

One might expect people in Arcata to question David Joseph's motives for such adamant opposition to the Arcata plan and Joseph to reciprocate. Such is not the case. Alexandra Stillman said, "David Joseph consideredhimself an environmentalist; he had taken over North Coast at a time when there was a lot of pollution. He thought we were going to pollute."

Sam Pennisi's view is more complex. "My perception was that Dave Joseph had belittled this project for so long that he had to save face. We saw him as a very nearsighted bureaucrat's bureaucrat."

Joseph thinks Stillman understood his motives perfectly. When he took over as chief executive of the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board, Humboldt Bay was an outdoor sewer. His job was to clean it up. "The state bays and estuaries policies said we should try as quickly as practicable to stop discharges." He believed that the Arcatans were standing in the way and were not being fair to their neighboring communities. "If you have a number of communities that are degrading a bay, if your objective is to clean up the bay, then everybody has to contribute and clean up their share," Joseph said. "You couldn't impose major expenditures on the city of Eureka if, at the same time, the city of Arcata was going to continue to dump effluent into the bay."

Still, Joseph's conflict was not with the people of Arcata or their elected representatives. Asked if he agreed with the Eureka Chamber of Commerce executive who found the Arcatans self-righteous, he replied, "I wouldn't say they were self-righteous. In keeping with the tenor of the times of the late '60s and '70s, they were properly concerned about what they conceived to be the old-time power structure running their town. They are my favorite people. I just love them. I don't think they can be faulted for what they did."

Nevertheless, there was conflict. It was not about the preservation of Humboldt Bay. Both sides agreed on that. It was about how to do it. Joseph believed that discharging treated waste water into the bay would pollute it, and he still thinks so. "What I found intellectually repugnant or dishonest about Arcata's position was the argument that they got people on the college staff to put forth that it was good for the bay to put waste water into the bay that at some time was raw sewage." Joseph still finds unacceptable the notion that natural processes cleanse the effluent. He questions the arguments of appropriate technology and appropriate scale and dismisses the idea that there would have been any danger to the bay from ruptures in the lines of the regional system.

Joseph had the courage of his convictions even when he did not have strong support from his own allies and even as sentiment began to shift to



After continued cleansing by the marsh's plants and algae, the treated waste water is used to raise trout and salmon. Here, feeding time at the trout pens.

Arcata's side. "Policy people seemed to have sympathy with us," Pennisi recalled. "Even as high up as EPA, there was sympathy with what we were trying to show. They thought it would be a boon if we succeeded. The main source of opposition was at North Coast." Pennisi continued:

I think they viewed us as pie-in-the-sky. We had some lofty things to say. They couldn't perceive that we could support what we were saying. Some of it had to do with our being a little town of 12,000 people. They felt they represented a region of 70,000 people.

They looked at it this way: "A solution is at hand. The feds are willing to fund it. Why are you standing in the way of a solution, Arcata?" I think they really believed they were right. It wasn't mean-spirited. It was much like our feeling about what we were doing.

The council was supported in its own community, but it attracted plenty of opposition from neighboring communities, especially from Eureka, only five miles distant. Chuck Goodwin, executive vice president of the Eureka Chamber of Commerce and a former Eureka City Council member, sat with representatives of Arcata and other bay communities on the Humboldt Bay Water Authority.

Arcata had been a willing signatory to the agreement to build a regional plant, he said, but then it used its status within the authority to create trouble and delay that cost the other communities money. Goodwin added:

It has affected relationships with Arcata and will affect them in the future. They had the best of all possible worlds: the shelter of HBWA from any reprisals because HBWA was going ahead with the program; on the other hand they had no compunctions about hamstringing the project all the way along.

Arcata is, in his view, much too willing to "mind other people's business." He makes it clear he is talking not only about sewer business but about timber business, too.

A BREAKTHROUGH, THEN RESOLUTION

Arcata's big break came in 1977 when the state Water Resources Control Board agreed to fund a $300,000 pilot study of Arcata's proposed system. For three years, water from the oxidation ponds flowed through 12 test cells—miniature marshes—emerging clean enough to swim in. Klopp's workers experimented patiently with all the variables—grasses, flow rates, bottom configurations—until they felt confident in their knowledge and control of the system.

While Arcata was testing its proposal, the regional plan was encountering obstacles. The state appellate court ruled the HBWA had

erred in rejecting petitions for a referendum. Responding to growing opposition to the regional plan, a legislative committee approved a bill to exempt Humboldt Bay from the state's prohibition of discharging sewer effluent that did not "enhance" the receiving body of water. This action signaled the legislature's acceptance of Arcata's view that its treated waste water was safe. Finally, in the spring of 1979 the HBWA ruled that a regional plant discharging to the ocean was no longer necessary. Each jurisdiction on the bay was to take responsibility for its own treatment system.

Arcatans who for five years had battled what they thought was wrongheaded technology and technocracy savored the moment. Reciting what might be called the innovator's creed, Arcata council member Sam Pennisi said: "We believed in experimentation, in the value of research . . . in risk-taking . . . in what we were doing."

The success of the pilot program and the HBWA ruling cleared the way for full-scale development of Arcata's marsh waste-water treatment plant, completed in 1985. Surveys show that about 195,000 visitors per year use the system's walking trails, fish in its marshes, or watch the waterfowl. Franklin Klopp's figures show that Arcata would have been forced to spend $10 million for its share of construction of the regional system. Instead, the town spent $5 million for the low-tech alternative. Its annual maintenance cost is $500,000 instead of $1.5 million, and the monthly cost per household is $9 instead of $27.

Arcata's waste-water treatment system is a success, it would seem, on several counts. Nonetheless, Pennisi cautions, "We try to tell people that we are a continuous experiment. We think that the experiment is working. But we want everyone very clear about the experimental nature of this. We like to blow our horn about the success we have had with the innovation, but we are reluctant to call it an unequivocal success. This is because credibility has always been a very important thing to us and to the scientists and to Frank [Klopp]."

Then he added, "It's like Don Quixote. You don't care how big the windmills are. You can take a windmill down with a bulldozer quickly or with a pocket knife slowly."

CHARITY ENDS AT HOME

CHAPTER

9

The curiosity of a young city-bred woman about her new home and neighbors in the small rural community of Leslie, Michigan, led Jean Ekins on the path that resulted 10 years later in creation of the Family Learning Center. The center is a comprehensive program of education and support services for high-school-age parents in Leslie and surrounding communities. It has helped hundreds of young mothers and a few young fathers become better parents and self-respecting adults.

At the outset, the strongest emotion the Family Learning Center evoked from the community was indifference. This soon developed into outright hostility, which over time mellowed into grudging acceptance. Year by year, step by step, with optimism, determination, and persistence, Ekins built the center into a multifaceted program serving young women in Leslie and its environs. During the first six months of the center's first year, 1974-1975, Ekins could offer her eight students only classroom teaching. During the second half of that year, she was able to provide unlicensed child day care. The center's budget that year was about $35,000.

By 1988 the center, on a budget of $140,000, was offering its students an array of services that included not only challenging classroom instruction but also licensed child day care, transportation, public health nursing, mental health counseling, nutritional information, and job counseling.

Ekins and her staff had shown their fellow townspeople that pregnant teen-agers, when taught and supported properly, could become citizens of whom the community could be proud. However, the school board recently cut back financial support for the center, and supporters, once again, had to seek sources of stable funding.

A young expectant mother feeds another student's child. Education at the Family Learning Center includes practical parenting skills.

In 1965, recently married to Richard Ekins, whom she had met while they were attending Michigan State University in Lansing, the former Jean Lombardini moved from the urban environment in which she had been raised to the rural area around Leslie to help her husband establish what was to become Family Crest Farm.

Ekins had started her college career in nursing, but she ended up majoring in history and minoring in education with a specialty in family life. Once settled into her new community, she taught for two years at nearby Jackson High School. Then she stayed home for seven years to care for her family.

The move to a rural community required some adjustments, "especially to there being so few people," she said. "But what a great place to raise a family!" Ekins said she just loves living in Leslie. She spent her first years in Leslie quietly looking at people and things. "I didn't say very much," she recalled, "and sure didn't say, 'My God, this is strange out here.' I just thought that to myself."

Jean Ekins' comments about her early days in the Leslie area manifest an observant detachment that contrasts strikingly with her committed participation in the life of the community. Those qualities have combined to make her an effective, one-woman force for innovation in Leslie and one of the town's mostly widely known and controversial citizens.

Ekins acknowledges her intellectual curiosity, if not her detachment from her community. "I'm sure I look at a lot of things differently. I am sure that gets me in a lot of trouble, too."

The plot of the Family Learning Center story goes like this: Ekins identifies a need and comes up with a way of meeting it. The community tells Ekins that she has permission to make her contribution to her community, but she will have to do it with little help and no, repeat no, tax money. Ekins accepts the challenge. She establishes the center and attracts students. She uses her ties to people and institutions outside Leslie to get the money and the credibility she needs to keep the Family Learning Center going and providing its services to the young people of Leslie and the surrounding townships. She faces down objections from religious and fiscal conservatives. But all the while, the community never develops a sense of "owning" the center. When, for the first time, the center costs the Leslie school district some money, the community begins to withdraw its permission, and Ekins is back to square one: find more outside money or watch the center atrophy.

NO COST TO THE SCHOOL BOARD

One of the things Ekins noticed early on was that there seemed to be a lot of young people not in school. Ready to return to teaching, she was

undecided about what to teach. Then in 1974 she remembered her earlier observations and began thinking, again, about dropouts. She got permission to see the dropout records for Leslie children.

Discussions with the school district's adult education director, Jan Chandler, and with other people in Leslie made Ekins aware that teenage pregnancy was—and always had been—a prime factor in the failure of a number of students to earn high school diplomas. In collaboration with Chandler, who became her partner in the early development of the center, and Louis Guizzetti, superintendent of Leslie public schools, Ekins decided to draft a proposal to the school board for a teen-parent education program.

Research by the state Board of Education cast teenage pregnancy as an urban issue and provided Ekins with little information about the extent of the problem in rural areas. She prepared her first proposal and subsequent proposals in the face of a general unwillingness among funders to consider teenage pregnancy as anything other than a city problem.

Ekins discovered, however, that the Michigan legislature had passed an act that, among other things, allowed reimbursement of up to $8,100 per teacher per year to local school districts offering accredited alternative programs for young parents. Michigan provides an allotment, amounting to about $2,944 per pupil in Leslie, for attendance. The school district, of course, was collecting no attendance funds for pregnant students who dropped out.

Ekins thus was able to meet the school board's condition that the program cost the school district nothing. She found eight girls willing to attend classes, and she found a site for her school. Although no room was available at the high school, a church rented its community room for $100 a month. State reimbursements covered Ekins' salary and the church rent. An ambivalent school board approved the plan for a one-semester trial.

CHALLENGES AND COMPLICATIONS

The challenge of teaching eight students with differing reading and mathematical abilities was formidable. It was complicated by these other factors:

- Extracurricular distractions. The task of raising small children claimed the energies of some students; others experienced stress caused by rape, incest, or other forms of violence.
- Transportation. Distances in the country are far. Fearing repercussions from parents who might not want their children in daily contact with obviously sexually active teen-agers, school authorities did not permit Ekins' students to ride school buses. If her students were old enough and had the use of a car they had to drive themselves; otherwise they had to find rides.

- Lack of reliable baby sitters.
- The need to be inconspicuous. Because some church members looked askance at use of the church by unwed mothers, Ekins took down all the trappings of school every night and put them back up next morning.
- Denial of "regular" school experience. Ekins believes that the center's students suffered from the absence of the variety of teachers, peers, and activities enjoyed by other high school students. Among those activities were the school newspaper and yearbook, field trips, physical education, and vocational education.

When Ekins reported on the center's first-semester accomplishments—the successful academic performance of eight former dropouts—she also requested permission to start a day-care center to permit more regular attendance by her students and to attract more young parents to the school. Convinced that state reimbursements would cover the added cost, the board approved. With the opening of the day-care center, supervised by a volunteer, enrollment doubled.

CHARITY ENDS AT HOME

THE PROBLEM OF VISIBILITY

Growth brought a new problem: visibility. As some 20 students began to bring their children to school with them, controversy mounted in Leslie. Ekins sensed four major community reactions. The largest group either had never heard of the center or ignored it. A small group supported her work and donated food and clothing to the students. A third group was suspicious, but Ekins felt they could be won over if they saw that the program cost "normal" students nothing and realized that it was helping others attain self-sufficiency. Finally, a vocal group of religious fundamentalists opposed the center on principle. They believed that by providing baby-sitting services, the program enabled the students to avoid their responsibilities. This group also believed the very existence of such a program implied community approval of adolescent sexual activity, and that, they thought, encouraged promiscuity.

Community resistance to the center surfaced during a debate over an issue not directly related to the center itself—a proposal to start a health-education program with a sex-education component to be taught from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. Ekins had been involved in development of the program and supported its establishment. The depth of community feeling about discussion of sex in the schools was brought sharply home to her when anonymous malefactors twice blew up her mailbox. Ekins worried that this latest controversy would jeopardize her school. Nonetheless, the school board renewed her program for the fall of 1975.

Jean Elkins developed the Family Learning Center's comprehensive program of education and support services for teenage parents.

That year, Ekins enrolled students from nearby Mason school district at the request of the its superintendent. Mason paid Leslie for each of the students the center accepted; other jurisdictions did so as well. This vote of confidence from people outside Leslie boosted Ekins' credibility with the Leslie board. It was the first of a series of outside transfusions that confirmed the value of the program, secured its budget over the years, and helped keep the center alive.

Although some people in the community continued to contribute goods, services, and a small amount of money, Ekins was still unable to get help from local civic and philanthropic groups such as the Rotary Club and United Way.

CHARITY ENDS AT HOME

Ekins recalls that at the end of the first year of operation, she knew exactly what her young charges needed—economic, social, and psychosocial services along with a core of quality high school education. Put another way, most of her students needed daily transportation, child care, health services, childrearing education, nutrition information, food stamps, employment, career, and personal counseling, housing, and welfare benefits as well as challenging instruction. Ekins believed, too, that counseling should be available not only to young mothers but also to young fathers and to the families of both.

"At the time, I don't think I used this term, but I was definitely thinking that case management was the way to deliver these services," Ekins recalled. Much of the rest of the Family Learning Center saga is the story of how, one by one, Ekins and her co-workers and supporters knit this comprehensive program together as they found the money to pay for its services.

By the summer of 1979 Ekins thought she had found a source of substantial additional funding. She applied for a state demonstration program designed to help school-age parents. At stake was state Board of Education recognition of the program and a $60,000 grant, an amount twice her annual budget. Her hopes were dashed when the Department of Education chose two urban centers and a large, rural regional center as model sites.

In 1980, however, the state changed criteria for the demonstration program to give greater consideration to small rural sites, and the Leslie Family Learning Center was chosen to receive a $60,000 grant; the award was renewed in subsequent years at a reduced level, $37,000 per year. The state's recognition and the resulting press coverage gave Ekins and the center new credibility with the Leslie school board and the community. The state's new interest did not occur without prompting. Ekins and company had taken to attending meetings of the state board and to having conversations with members of the legislature who, in turn, exerted

themselves on behalf of Leslie and other small communities. Each year thereafter, the center was able to expand enrollment and the array of services it offered.

National recognition followed in time. Eventually the center was described in *Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage & Despair* (Doubleday, 1988), by Elizabeth Schorr and Daniel Schorr, and the model was replicated in other Michigan cities and in communities as far away as California. One unpleasant effect of all this attention was that it seemed to incite the center's local critics to greater opposition.

FUNDAMENTALISM IN LESLIE

Tom Helma, a psychologist who was a counselor at the Family Learning Center, acquired his first impressions of Leslie when he was working as the director of a mental health center in nearby Mason. "We had a satellite office in Leslie, in the local Methodist Church, and we sent a counselor there once a week," Helma recalled. From those counseling sessions, he got the impression that a lot of the town's residents, many of whom hailed from the rural South, had a profound distrust of anything that was new or different or represented the outside world.

Attracted to Michigan by opportunities for work in the auto industry in Lansing, these rural Southerners chose to live as far away from the city as practicable "to preserve the isolation they had known in the South," Helma said. Because of his own background, he well understood these people and their opposition to the Family Learning Center.

Raised a Roman Catholic, in his adolescence Helma had fallen in love with a girl who had embraced fundamentalism. "I thought it pragmatic to do the same," he remarked dryly years later. Not given to half measures, he went to Bob Jones University, the fundamentalist school in Greenville, South Carolina, to earn a degree in Bible theology. "I spent three years wandering the halls of fundamentalism," Helma said. This odyssey prepared him for what he would find in Ingham County.

The transplanted Southerners, Helma found, "really have a country perspective. They believe in local autonomy, the power of the local community, and they have indigenous cultural perspectives that are sometimes interpretations of fundamentalism without benefit of theology." Although they had been in the North since World War II, they had not lost their sense of strict community. "They do not trust large institutions. They think such institutions represent the worst of secular humanism."

A WATCHDOG FOR THE SCHOOLS

The *Leslie Local Independent* is a 120-year-old weekly newspaper that has a circulation of 1,900 in the town of Leslie and in the townships of Leslie, Rives, Onondaga, Henrietta, Bunker Hill, and Tompkin. Its staff of 11 puts

out the mixture of news, features, obituaries, birth announcements, sports news, ads, and pure hometown puffery found in the newspapers of small communities across the United States. On the last of the *Local's* 24 unnumbered pages is its Opinion section.

Here, in any issue of the *Local* in any year since the Family Learning Center was started in 1974, are likely to be found the musings of Marty Nystrom, former member of the Leslie school board and steadfast opponent of secular humanism, situation ethics, birth control, teenage sex, sex education for teen-agers, and the Family Learning Center. Nystrom is a prolific letter writer, and he uses the Opinion page to communicate with his allies in Ingham County.

An opponent of public education who sent his children to a private Baptist academy and later taught them at home, Nystrom got himself elected to the school board to serve as its watchdog. Since the school system is the largest single employer in the community and provides the focus of social life and recreation, his exertions have had a strong influence in Leslie and environs.

In a 1986 letter to the *Local*, Nystrom inveighed against the school board's adoption of a course at Leslie High School on making choices. He argued that the course exposed children to decisions that they were too young to handle. "The rate of illiteracy in this country is appalling and getting worse! We have not yet been so successful in teaching our children to read and write that we can afford to take on the task of teaching them to make decisions as well."

In October 1987 Nystrom was again concerned about a proposed course of instruction, this one proposed for the Family Learning Center through the high school's home economics department. He approved the portions of the course that dealt with nutrition, communication skills, and money management. He objected to those that, he charged, touched on students' knowledge of and feelings about sexual involvement, contraception, abortion, unmarried couples living together, and homosexual relationships. He objected to such information being presented to students. "I believe we need to follow the absolute standard to [*sic*] right and wrong that is presented in God's word," he wrote.

By June 1989, no longer a member of the school board, Nystrom had shifted his assault on the Family Learning Center to the question of money. Here the religious conservative joined hands with fiscal conservatives, not all of whom were his co-religionists. He quoted a member of the school board as saying the board would have to cut academic courses if a millage tax that supports the schools were not increased by voters. His letter suggested that the best way to avoid a deficit in the school budget was to cut "the Family Learning Center and other non-academic classes first."

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The letter, printed, as was the policy of the *Local*, without correction for spelling or grammar, continued:

The Family Learning Center sends a message to kids. It says go ahead and have SEX, do what ever you want to do. If someone gets pregnant, the TAXPAYERS will help take care of you & baby, even if you are not from Leslie School District. It promotes promiscuity, PLAIN AND SIMPLE.

If the basic's were stressed and things such as the Family Learning Center and other classes that promote Socialism and humanism were cut, Leslie Schools would have no budget problems.

The following July, he returned to the theme that the town would have to choose between the Family Learning Center and the academic curriculum:

I do not feel that the public schools, funded by the taxpayers, are responsible for pregnant teens for baby sitting, counsuling, etc. If anything ABSTINENCE SHOULD BE TAUGHT AND STRESSED. Yes, I have compassion for pregnant teens, however the schools should not be trying to solve there problems by taking on some or much of the girls own responsibility. This is what families, plus agencies other than the public schools are for. The F.L.C. is a form of socialism. When will the Liberals in our society learn that Socialism simply does not work? Just look at Russia and China.

Our Schools need to get back to simply teaching and stressing the basic's and not try to solve society's problem's. Leslie Schools have an excellent Science program. . . . Let's build on these sort of idea's and see our schools get back to the basic's, traditional value's and hard work."

Only occasionally did readers respond to Nystrom's animadversions against the Family Learning Center. One who did, in July 1989, was Janice Kimble, who had been a substitute teacher at the center. Praising Jean Ekins as a leader in her field, Kimble offered this rebuttal to Nystrom:

No indignant, self-righteous condemnation of immorality is going to help single dependent mothers turn their lives around so they can become contributing members of society. Instead, they need exactly what is offered by the Family Learning Center, which is an informed understanding to instill self-esteem, the gaining of knowledge to supplant ignorance, and training to overcome helpless dependence which I can testify none of these girls enjoy.

DIGNITY UNDER FIRE

Tom Helma, the psychologist, was present the day in May 1986 when a group of fundamentalists attempted to intervene during a site visit to the Family Learning Center by two consultants sent to check the authenticity of the facts contained in Ekins' application for a Ford Foundation Innovations Award.

Someone had alerted the assistant minister of Bible Baptist Church, and he and a portion of his flock arrived at the center, insisting that they be allowed to participate in the meeting. They began grilling the consultants, Julia Scott of the Children's Defense Fund, and Margaret Gill Hein, an education expert. As Helma recalled:

In the meeting itself, Jean and I separated the minister from his flock. I took him into the day-care center and showed him the babies while Jean took the women and Julia and Margaret into the classroom area, where they (the consultants) were going to do some group interviews with the young women.

In the course of talking with the minister about the purpose of the Family Learning Center being to create better bonding between parents and children, I told him about my degree. I asked him, as a Christian minister, how he could think that I, as a Christian, could endorse such a thing as abortion.

After a while, he came out and told the others that he had talked with Brother Helma, "who assures me that this is something that good Christians can support." And, indeed, later some of these people donated things to the center, brought cookies, and served as volunteers.

The minister began to speak to the young mothers at the center, using such words as "fornication" and "adultery." With great composure, they calmly and effectively responded to his charges. Helma said that what might have been a traumatizing experience was turned into a kind of victory for the students:

One of my standouts, named Angel, spoke eloquently on behalf of another girl there who was pregnant as a result of forced intercourse. She made the additional point that some of the people there had gotten pregnant in circumstances where, if they could do it over again, they might not make that choice. That they were trying to redeem their lives. And that what the minister was saying was not making it any easier. God bless Angel. I love her.

The effect of the experience on the girls was that it raised their self-esteem. It gave them a chance to speak out on their own behalf and convey their feelings to a group of adults. We didn't intend this to happen, but the way we handled the crisis was typical of the way Family Learning Center approached everything: showing the girls that in every milieu they have an opportunity to exercise their voice on their own behalf.

AN INSTRUCTIONAL PLUS

The Ford Foundation grant of $80,000, awarded in June 1986, allowed Ekins to acquire a three-classroom building for the center and to buy new day-care equipment. By 1988 the Red Cross had begun to provide low-cost food and supplies for the center's 120 students and their children, and Ekins had begun to consult for a national child-care program run by Wellesley College's Center for Research on Women. Public attitudes toward the

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discussion of human sexuality in the schools were beginning to soften.

"We had a case of AIDS in one of our schools," Leslie School Superintendent Tom Dove reported. "That woke people up to the fact that education is a key thing in our schools and that we had better open up and talk about this and educate our kids with the key facts. This was not a very pleasant thing to go through from the superintendent's standpoint, but it worked out for the good in the long run."

Indeed, Dove thinks that scare contributed to the successful development by school staff and adoption by the board of a high school course in human sexuality required by Michigan law. Prepared in consultation with the community and submitted to the public for comment at meetings, the curriculum was approved with little fuss. It was taught on a trial basis in the 1988–89 school year and adopted permanently in the 1989–90 year.

"It's a good course," Dove said. "The teacher is a fundamentalist who believes abstinence is the best way to avoid conception. But she teaches the rest."

As for the Family Learning Center itself, its achievements include a 90 percent graduation rate among its young women, an excellent record of healthy babies born to students, almost no repeat pregnancies, and some successful careers launched.

Superintendent Dove finds no negatives to it. "It's an opportunity for the girls and boys to come to terms with whatever problem they have. It's an instructional plus." And he is not surprised that the little Leslie school district is being emulated by much larger districts across the country, including Lansing's.

It also has a good effect on the Leslie high school students outside of the center, Tom Dove said. "We have held our dropout rate here very low. Jean's program contributes to that. Very few do not finish their high school education."

Leslie Local staffer Kay Haynes put the center's achievement in personal terms. One of her relatives came to Leslie from Mason; she was pregnant and would not go to school in Mason. "Without the center, she wouldn't have finished high school," Haynes said. But now the young woman's prospects are considerably brighter. "She plans to go to college. She lives with her husband in Colorado."

IF NOT FOR THE CENTER

On the evening of August 19, 1989, five young mothers who were students at the Family Learning Center joined Jean Ekins in one of its classrooms to talk about their lives and how the school changed them. The young women's fondness for Ekins communicated itself without words, as did hers for them. In her dealings with them, she was consistently positive

and upbeat, treating them as any good teacher would her pupils.

Jessica, a small, blonde, wiry 17-year-old, brought her baby son, a large, healthy-looking child. She spoke about what it meant to her to be able to come to school at the center. She would not otherwise have been able to finish high school, she said, because she would have been too humiliated to attend classes in her home town.

Another young woman, Dawn, had been able come to the center only because a friend had driven her there. With no driver's license and no car, Dawn was completely dependent on others for transportation—a difficulty many students at the center confront and a continuing problem in this rural area. Dawn lived with her parents and her baby son, Craig, whose pictures she shared with the group. The boy's father, Ron, was supportive throughout her pregnancy and has remained attentive. She said he was a devoted father to Craig and visited them both frequently.

Jessica, looked at Dawn's pictures of Craig and offered some snapshots of her own child. The two gossiped about other classmates and their families with an easy familiarity.

Cathy, an attractive young Native American woman, graduated the year before among the top ten at Leslie High School—despite the reluctance of some school officials to allow a center student among the honor graduates. Her boyfriend, Andy, had dropped her off at the center and driven off in her "new," large, very old car to play basketball; he had their son, Andrew, in tow. Cathy, whose parents were both alcoholics, has participated in the Al Anon program for teens. Of the educational quality of the center, she said, "It's a shame you have to get knocked up to come to a great school like this."

Kelly, who joined the group late, appeared older than the rest and was more formally turned out in a white summer dress. After she graduated from Leslie, she attended a Lansing design institute. Now married, she has started her own design studio. Ekins said she was continually impressed by how carefully Kelly and her husband planned their lives together.

Each of the young women offered the same testimonial to the Family Learning Center: "If it had not been for the center, there is no way that I would have graduated from high school, because I would have been too embarrassed to attend school in my hometown when I was pregnant. Here I not only could attend school among people like me who were sympathetic to me, I got a better education than I would have gotten in my own school, pregnant or not."

Toward the end of the evening, Dawn mentioned something about one of Marty Nystrom's letters to the *Leslie Local*. No one else had read it so Jean Ekins gave them copies.

Nystrom's depiction of the curriculum at the Family Learning Center as "make-work" courses particularly stung Cathy. "He should come over here and try those courses: English, history, social studies, math. They weren't snap courses. They were well taught, and they were hard. We worked for our grades."

When the young women read the part where Nystrom accused the center of encouraging sexual activity among young people, they were taken aback. Cathy said to Ekins, "Why don't you invite this guy over here and let us talk to him?"

FOR ALL ITS ACHIEVEMENTS

For all its achievements, the Family Learning Center faced a new crisis in the summer of 1989. Having survived the criticisms of religious conservatives, the center became a target for fiscal conservatives when it ran up small deficits—around $9,000 during the 1987-88 school year and $4,800 the following year.

The fiscal conservatives claimed that Superintendent Dove and Ekins had gone back on a promise made 15 years earlier that the center would not be a financial expense to the school district. "We don't ensure the public that kindergarten or science courses will break even," Tom Dove said, "but there is a great desire in this community that the district spend no local funds on this program." In any case, the Leslie school board refused in July to provide any more money for the center and put its refusal in writing. The result was that when the school opened in the fall, Ekins was, once again, its only teacher. That lasted for nine weeks until state funds for additional teachers became available. Despite these uncertainties, however, Ekins says, "This has been a good year. Our day-care staff is intact and so is our transportation service. We have a new 'home-bound' teacher who brings lessons to students recuperating from childbirth and she also serves as a substitute teacher in the school. The situation is not at all bleak, just tenuous, and changing all the time."

ON INNOVATION

CHAPTER

10

Our continent has witnessed innovation from its recorded beginnings. Indigenous Americans—Narragansetts, Hopis, Aleuts, Seminoles—knit together distinct systems of commerce and governance that responded to and reflected the requirements of their widely varying climates, resources, and cultures. European colonists, an ocean away from the old ways and the physical and cultural context in which the old ways worked, had to innovate in order to feed, clothe, and shelter themselves. Above all, they found new ways to govern themselves and fought the War of Independence for the right to continue to do so.

Yet by 1900 the United States had developed its own set of "old ways." A bold group of writers called "muckrakers" stunned the public by revealing how detrimental many of these practices were to society. The writers, who included Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, and Upton Sinclair, attacked municipal graft, securities fraud, and abuses of corporate trusts. Many states introduced legislative and administrative reforms, patterned after those instituted by Governors Robert La Follette in Wisconsin, John Peter Altgeld in Illinois, and Hiram Johnson in California. This Progressive movement gave state government the direct primary, the initiative and referendum, the civil service system for public employees, and the progressive income tax. Reforms in municipal government paralleled those in state government, and Theodore Roosevelt won a second term in the White House, partially on his reputation as a trust-buster.

Although the American social and political climate doesn't always favor reforms or the innovations accompanying them, change is inevitable. At the national level particularly, periods of activism almost invariably follow complacent eras. Innovation gets little encouragement in the latter but is highly prized in the former.

The eight programs reviewed in this book represent a small fraction of the innovative programs under way in state and local government. They may be seen as part of a surge of activity in the last decade that began to

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redefine the terms under which the business of government is conducted. If it continues, this process and its attendant innovation could represent an enormously important development for the United States, nothing less than a sweeping restructuring of the public sector as we enter the third century of our experiment in democracy.

For that experiment to succeed, we must continually review our methods to learn what works best and why. With this in mind, it is worth noting some of the principal lessons that may be drawn from the experiences of states, cities, and individual innovators in the first three years of the Innovations Awards Program.

Several scholars, striving for valid generalizations about the innovation process, have concluded that although some innovations occur through deliberate policy planning, others more typically result from a process some analysts call "groping along."* In this second kind of innovation, the original idea or policy is less important than the experimentation through which the idea is refined and adapted.

Of the innovations profiled here, Missouri's Parents As Teachers comes closest to being a product of deliberate policy planning. Although implementing the program statewide was, in itself, innovative, the idea already existed in the form of a model parent education program Mildred Winter brought with her from suburban St. Louis.

For the most part, the seven other innovations are of the second type. In St. Louis County, the innovators in the public safety department had a clear idea of what they wanted: software that would allow police officers to make computerized reports. When they found out that no such software existed, they began groping toward a definition of precisely what the department needed.

The creation of alternatives to incarceration in Georgia was preceded by a planning phase during which the innovators consulted judges and other law enforcement officers. But the full array of sentencing options that came to define the program was the result of a gradual movement from one alternative to the next.

The case of Arcata seems to conform best to the "groping along" model. At the outset, the innovators had powerful economic and political motivations to seek an alternative to the expensive, regional waste-water treatment plant on the state's drawing board. But they hadn't even a vague notion of what that alternative should be. Indeed, they did not realize that they were after a new solution. They began with a question, "If not this plan, what?" Their answer, which happened to involve unconventional

*Olivia Golden has described these two approaches in a paper entitled "Innovation in Public Sector Human Services Programs: The Implications of Innovation by 'Groping Along'," from which some of this general analysis is drawn. Golden notes that Robert Behn, Angela Browne, and Aaron Wildavsky previously described this phenomenon. The phrase "groping along" is Behn's. See his article "Groping Along" in the *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1988, pp 643-663.

technology for waste-water treatment, evolved slowly into an elegant modulation of elements: treatment, wetlands, aquaculture, and recreation.

Golden says that some of the award-winning innovations conform to the following general pattern: A problem is identified and an approach broadly defined. Consensus around that approach is built, and, based on an understanding of agency capacity and other factors, initial plans are drawn and some action is taken. Once the program is launched, the innovator begins to rely on feedback, which is then used to modify the initial approach. New ways of evaluating results, new performance measures, and new ways of obtaining information are sometimes developed, and the innovator uses them to refine the program further.

ON THE INNOVATORS

ON INNOVATION

Among these innovators' virtues are tenacity, commitment, inquisitiveness, optimism, concern for clients, and a sense of social responsibility. Their capacity to learn as they go and to adapt their proposals accordingly allows them to steer innovations through the long development process. A look at some of these virtues may shed light on qualities that can help produce innovation.*

- Innovators tend to be "good product champions," to borrow a phrase from the private sector; they can communicate their vision and mobilize support for new ideas, or "products."
- Innovators can apply skills gained in other settings to the problem at hand.
- Because they tend to be good communicators (they listen as well as they talk), innovators are also good at building and maintaining networks with different constituencies. They work well with other people, are optimistic and inspiring, and are ready to share credit widely.
- Innovators are close to the people they serve. They are good at linking problems to solutions. They are committed to their work and have a strong sense of social responsibility.
- Innovators are good at winning agency support for their cause. They have what is known in Minnesota state government as "system savvy." They know how to get things done in their organizations, understand who should be involved, what the internal and external politics are, and how to get resources for a project.
- Innovators know how to incorporate conventional, widely approved values in their drive for unconventional outcomes, and that often is a source of legitimacy in their communities.

*Many of these ideas are derived from the Altshuler and Zegans article cited in Chapter 1. Others are adapted from David Arnold's observations in the Ford Foundation *Letter*, November 1988.

When innovations demonstrate results, they gain support sufficient to let them endure even after their original champions depart. A program like Parents As Teachers, though strongly identified with the administration of former Governor Kit Bond, has been funded by successive state administrations because it is so widely popular. Similarly, in Illinois, when Governor James Thompson, who supported One Church–One Child, did not seek reelection, adoption staff of the state Department of Children and Family Services believed that the program, a proven success, would be continued although it might face administrative adjustments under a new administration.

The St. Louis CARE program became institutionalized the moment patrol officers used it and saw that it worked and would save them the time, nuisance, and drudgery of report writing. When an innovation creates a sense of ownership among both its employees and its clientele, it gains the broad support that will sustain it over time. One might say that Georgia's Alternatives to Incarceration became institutionalized during its planning period, when its ultimate users—judges—were carefully consulted about its design.

Each of these eight cases demonstrates that it is possible for a government agency to be both innovative and accountable, for each occurred within the framework of legal accountability. These innovators were not loose cannons. Far from it. They were team players trying to improve their agencies' performance, and they were accountable to their bosses, to their elected officials, and to the voters. Even more important, they demonstrated that the kind of accountability that holds the worker responsible yet permits him or her the leeway needed to get results is far preferable to red-tape accountability.

INTO THE NEXT CENTURY

There is no question that a period of innovation in American state and local government is at hand. As noted earlier, *if* it continues, it *could* represent an important watershed, nothing less than a restructuring of our public sector as we enter the third century of our experiment in democracy. It could mark our transition from a society in which "nothing seems to work" to a society in which "nothing is impossible."

However, one must emphasize *if* and *could*, for continued restructuring depends on changes in American attitudes toward government. In particular, those who govern must be given greater latitude than they presently have to find workable solutions to the problems the United States faces. That is probably asking a lot of a people

whose political traditions, language, and even humor are suffused with a mistrust of government and those who work at governing. Perhaps the best one can hope for is temporary suspension of such attitudes until people like the innovators introduced here can prove that they deserve more latitude.

Are cynical attitudes toward government employees wholly unfounded? Of course not. There are among them the timeservers criticized in reports of state and federal blue-ribbon commissions on fraud, waste, and abuse, in editorials, and in comedians' monologues. But there are also their opposites, and it is on them that we must ultimately depend.

Behind each of the programs described in the preceding chapters are men and women who care deeply about the responsibilities assigned to them and the people they aim to serve. Even in the absence of strong incentives to excel and innovate, these people strive for excellence and take risks in order to find better ways to accomplish the public's business. They do so in part because of their pride in work well done, but also because of their moral engagement in the problems they deal with in the course of their work.

THE GIFT OF DISCRETION

In each of the eight cases, the innovators' virtues were catalyzed by an additional factor: the innovators were allowed enough discretion to carry out the innovations and thereby achieve a range of benefits. Discretionary latitude is essential to innovative performance.

And there's the rub. Discretion is not something Americans lavish on public employees even though, oddly, we applaud its being given to workers in the private sector. Worse yet, taking discretion away from public employees (and elected officials, too) has been the chief tactic of many governmental reforms in the United States. That is because most reform comes in response to scandal, and whether the reforms emanate from the left or the right of the political spectrum, the tendency has been to try to prevent future scandals by tightening controls on individual workers' discretion. This is where red tape comes from. Too often, the price of avoiding scandal is doing nothing in the face of serious problems, or moving so slowly in response to them that solutions are made more difficult.

The restructuring of American government, of which these eight stories are but harbingers, is not likely to come to fruition unless we change the rules and incentives under which public business is done. Rather than insisting on layers of controls on public servants, Americans should provide their government workers with broad standards for performance and then hold them accountable for achieving those standards.

To put a man on the moon, administrators in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration did not start by telling their staff that they wanted a spacecraft of certain dimensions. Instead, they brought together an eager group of engineers and scientists and challenged them to collaborate in creating a spaceship that could achieve the lofty objective of the program.

Similarly, it ought to be possible for the governor of a state to set performance standards. For example, rather than tinkering with existing social services to lower the overall level of dependency in the state, it seems more promising to challenge employees in all the state's human services agencies to achieve the goal of helping a certain percentage of dependent families achieve self-sufficiency within, say, 15 months. "We do not know how we will accomplish this goal," the governor might say in issuing the challenge, "but we are open to the best thinking of any state employee or any citizen about how to achieve it."

Would the state's department heads rise to the challenge? Would they engage their staffs in the challenge? Would a workable program with a measurable result come out of it? Perhaps more to the point, would the state's voters reward or punish the governor for his or her innovative approach? The answers are not clear.

What is clear is that tightly controlled, hierarchical ways of implementing public policy have not achieved the desired solutions. The time is ripe for big changes in the way Americans think about government, the values they attach to it, and the ways they evaluate its performance. Application of performance standards coupled with positive encouragement of innovation could stimulate new excitement about what government can accomplish. That spirit of invention will surely benefit the nation as it moves into the 21st century.

AWARD RECIPIENTS

APPENDIX I

1986

STATE OF ARIZONA

GROUND-WATER MANAGEMENT CODE

A comprehensive law to stem the ever-increasing overdraft of the state's ground water and achieve a "safe yield" by the year 2025. The code caps agricultural use of water at current levels; permits the sale of water rights for the first time; regulates industrial and mining use; requires metering and reporting of all water use; and imposes a pump tax.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

FOOD ASSISTANCE NETWORK (FOODNET)

Annually distributing some 18,000 tons of food from federal surpluses and private sources to more than one million needy citizens, FOODNET mobilizes 20,000 volunteers in 1,200 churches and community organizations in 45 cities. A core staff in the county's Department of Community and Senior Citizen Services provides central coordination, communication, and training.

STATE OF ILLINOIS

ONE CHURCH-ONE CHILD

A creative effort to recruit black families as adoptive parents initiated by the state's Department of Children and Family Services, One Church-One Child has built ties with a statewide network of black ministers and churches to encourage the adoption of one child by one family in each church.

STATE OF ILLINOIS

QUALITY INCENTIVE PROGRAM (QUIP)

Illinois' Bureau of Long-Term Care has developed a system for improving nursing home care by using Medicaid reimbursement as an incentive. Nurse-care managers employed by the department rate the performance of each of Illinois' 700 nursing homes on six indices of quality. Institutions receiving higher ratings receive higher reimbursement. The ratings are published, thereby bringing market pressures to bear on nursing homes to improve their services.

INGHAM COUNTY, MICHIGAN

FAMILY LEARNING CENTER, LESLIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

This model program in rural Michigan is helping overcome the isolation and rejection experienced by teenage parents. By coordinating child care, transportation, education, and social services, and by working with young parents' extended families, the program enables teen-agers to complete their education and lead more productive lives.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

STRIVE TOWARD EXCELLENCE IN PERFORMANCE (STEP)

The Minnesota Department of Administration is encouraging state employees to suggest innovative public-private partnerships and other means of improving government services. Good ideas are approved with a minimum of red tape and the ideas' initiators are then given responsibility for implementing them. Among the projects are a work program for welfare recipients and an improved cash management system that has increased the state's interest earnings.

SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA

ST. ANTHONY PARK BLOCK NURSE PROGRAM

An unusual experiment drawing on professional and volunteer services of neighbors and family, the program provides care for the elderly in their own homes and helps to avoid premature nursing home confinement. Nurses and volunteers, all of them residents of St. Anthony Park, provide personal care, companionship, and help with household chores to elderly residents.

NEW YORK CITY

JUVENILE JUSTICE CASE MANAGEMENT

To make productive use of "dead time" spent by children in detention, and to break repetitive cycles of delinquency, the city's Department of Juvenile Justice has instituted a case management system to coordinate existing social services and tailor them to each child's individual needs. Working with families, courts, probation officers, welfare agencies, schools, and social workers, the program has increased the rate of children's return to school after detention.

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

VIDEO DISC PROPERTY CATALOG

The City of Rochester has applied new technology—the laser video disc—to compile a pictorial record of all properties in the city. The technology provides property owners and city officials with immediate access to information about any property. It also helps to explain the assessing process, enhances the consistency of valuations, minimizes protests of unfairness, reduces the need for field inspections, and increases the bureau's efficiency.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

REHABILITATION ENGINEERING PROGRAM

In 1978 the state's Department of Vocational Rehabilitation established an engineering unit to make modifications to homes, work sites, and vehicles that would help the handicapped lead more productive lives. Engineers for the department have modified wheelchairs for cerebral palsy victims, designed hand controls for automobiles and lifts for vans, built ramps for wheelchair patients, and fashioned a breathing device for a laryngectomy patient.

1987

ARCATA, CALIFORNIA

INTEGRATED WETLAND ENHANCEMENT AND SALMON RANCHING PROGRAM

A lagoon and wetlands sewage treatment system producing high-quality effluent that has restored marshes both for wildlife and for recreation. The program has saved taxpayers millions of dollars and has restored degraded industrial coastal land to biological productivity.

STATE OF GEORGIA

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

Faced with a federal mandate to reduce severe prison overcrowding, the Georgia Department of Corrections developed a continuum of sentencing options with increasing degrees of punishment, control, supervision, and offender services. Since 1982, the program has saved hundreds of millions of dollars in what would have been costly and unnecessary imprisonment.

STATE OF ILLINOIS

PARENTS TOO SOON

Founded in 1983, this statewide initiative to reduce the incidence and mitigate the adverse consequences of teen pregnancy has resulted in an 18 percent decline in Illinois' teen birth rate. Its effectiveness is attributed to an unusually high degree of collaboration among the state and local agencies involved.

DULUTH, MINNESOTA

DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAM

Acknowledging that the traditional handling of domestic disputes as "family matters" was ineffective, the Duluth Police Department has been working with the City Attorney, courts, and probation and human services agencies to develop the Domestic Abuse Intervention Program. Under the program, police treat abusers in violent domestic quarrels as criminals, making arrests and prosecutions that have proved effective in deterring repeat offenses.

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

HOMELESS SERVICES NETWORK

A centralized "intake" facility assists St. Louis' homeless with a comprehensive array of services, coordinated by advocacy and other civic groups that make up the network. A second phase plans to enlarge the city's shelter capacity and address the root causes of homelessness.

STATE OF MISSOURI

PARENTS AS TEACHERS PROGRAM

Created by the Missouri State Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, the program makes trained parent-educators available in all of Missouri's 543 school districts. They provide in-home instruction to parents on ways to enhance their children's development during the crucial first three years. The program also monitors the child's progress for early detection of learning problems or disabilities.

NEW YORK CITY

THE NOVA ANCORA PROJECT

Sponsored by the New York City Department of Probation, Nova Ancora is a private, nonprofit economic development corporation that creates jobs for unskilled probationers in small businesses and light industry. Based on the premise that vocational training and gainful employment are important aspects of an offender's rehabilitation, the program has achieved a low 3 percent recidivism rate for participants.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

THE OPEN PUBLIC EVENTS NETWORK

OPEN/Net is a project of the state's Agency for Public Telecommunications. It aims to bring government closer to the people by using live, interactive, prime-time cable television. In weekly two-hour programs, North Carolinians can watch state government hearings and live interviews and have the opportunity afterward to speak directly with the officials and experts via a toll-free telephone number.

DALLAS, TEXAS

VISION THROUGH DIVERSITY PROGRAM

To improve access to recreational programs, the Department of Parks and Recreation created a package designed to reach particular groups of citizens: the disabled, minorities, low-income families, and shift workers. Among the programs: round-the-clock activities in Reverchon Park downtown, including midnight softball, nighttime picnicking, and aerobics at three in the morning.

FORT WORTH, TEXAS

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

A low-tech, low-manpower program to spot and measure pollution in runoff from the city's storm drains has revolutionized the management of water-pollution control operations. Using simplified versions of sophisticated techniques to check levels of chemical and biological contaminants, the program could be adopted nationally at a fraction of the $8.5 billion being spent on the problem this year.

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

SINGLE-ROOM OCCUPANCY RESIDENTIAL HOTEL PROGRAM

Reverses the decline of privately-owned housing for the city's low-income population and eases the crisis of homelessness by encouraging the rehabilitation and construction of single-room occupancy hotels (SROs) by the private sector.

FORT COLLINS, COLORADO

LAND DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE SYSTEM

This new, flexible guide for urban planning and development incorporates land use, design, and location into a single decision-making process that has eliminated many of the delays and headaches of traditional zoning approaches.

STATE OF ILLINOIS

PROJECT MATCH

Sponsored by the Department of Public Aid, the project is helping the hard-to-employ move toward self-sufficiency through a case management approach that stays with clients on the very long and tough road out of the welfare system. The project helps participants return to school, obtain job training, find and keep jobs, and advance in a career.

STATE OF KENTUCKY

VIDEO COURTS

The Court of Justice has replaced court reporters and audiotapes with videotapes in trial courts across the state, providing instantaneous records of court proceedings for lawyers and juries, and lowering the cost of justice.

STATE OF KENTUCKY

PARENT AND CHILD EDUCATION PROGRAM

Working through local school districts in isolated mountain areas, the Department of Education combines adult education with early childhood development. The aim is to stop the intergenerational cycle of illiteracy and academic failure in rural areas.

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

INDUSTRY ACTION PROJECT

The project has helped mature industries such as garment manufacturing prosper through cooperative planning among employers, unions, employees, city and state agencies, retailers, and colleges and universities.

TUPELO, MISSISSIPPI

PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN EDUCATION

The Municipal School District is working with private citizens, business, city government, and local foundations to make Tupelo one of the top ten public school systems in the nation. The partners fund innovative projects in the schools that the city alone could not afford.

COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

COMPUTER–ASSISTED REPORT ENTRY

The St. Louis County Police Department has custom-designed an automated system enabling police and citizens to file crime reports. It combines the telephone and the computer, and allows officers to spend more time on patrol and less time filling out forms.

CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO

RACIAL INTEGRATION INCENTIVES

Promotes racial integration in a cluster of area suburbs in eastern Cuyahoga County by attracting home buyers to areas where their race is underrepresented.

STATE OF VERMONT

STATEWIDE LIBRARY AUTOMATION PROJECT

Uses computers to make the state's public and private library collections available to every citizen. Now the smallest rural libraries in Vermont have access to the largest research collections in the state.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

APPENDIX II

1986–88

William G. Milliken
Chairman of the National Committee
Traverse City, Michigan

Walter Broadnax
Commissioner
New York State Department of
Civil Service
Albany, New York

Yvonne B. Burke
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